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sender of a telegram. The case went upon a demurrer to the petition which alleged both mental sufferings and pecuniary injury, ind
the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to "nominal damages
at least."
BFsJAMIN F. REX.
St.Louis.
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RINTOUL v. NEW YORK CENT. & I. R. RAILROAD 00.
A clause in a bill of lading which provides that the carrier, who is legally H4
for any damage, shall have the benefit of any insurance that may have been efreft~d
upon the damaged goods, is not an unreasonable and unjust exemption from liability
for negligence, and may be enforced.
When it is shown that goods were injured while being transported over a railroad operated by defendants, and that the accident was one which, in the ordinary
course of things, would not have happened if those who bad the management had
used ordinary care, the presumption, in the ibsence of explanation by the defendants,
is that the accident arose from the latter's negligence.

THIs was an action against a common carrier for the loss 'of
goods destroyed while in course of transportation, in consequence
of a fire caused by a collision between two trains of a railroad over

which the goods were were being transported. The goods had been
shipped under a bill of lading issue'd by the Merchants' Dispatch
Transportation CMmpany, an association engaged in the business of
contracting for the carriage of goods between various points, and in
procuring such carriage by the railroad companies. The following
were the material conditions of the bill of lading:
"That the said Merchants' Dispatch Transportation Company
and its connections which receives said property, shall not be liable
• * * for loss or damage by wet, dirt, fire, * * * nor for loss or

'damage of any'article or property.whatever, by fire or other casualty,
while in transit, *

*

*

nor for loss or damage by fire, co]hsion,

or the dangers of navigation, while on seas, rivers, lakes or canals.
*,.*

*

"It is further stipulated and agreed, that, in case of any loss,,
detriment or damage done to or sustained by any of the property
herein receipted for during such transportation, whereby any legal
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liability or respopsibility shall or may be incurred, that company
alone shall be held answerable therefor in whose actual custody the
same may be at the time of the happening of such loss, detriment
or damage, and the carrier so liable shall have the full benefit of
any insurance that may have been effected upon or on account
of said goods. * * *

"Notice. In accepting this bill of lading the shipper, or the
agent of the owner of the property carried, expressly accepts and
agrees to all its stipulations, exceptions and conditions, whether
written or printed."
The cause was tried, by agreement, without a jury, upon an
agreed statement of facts, the material parts of which have been
given above.
Georqe V. WMngate, for plaintiffs.

Frank Loomis, for defendants.
SHIPmAN, J. (after stating the facts).
I. The fundamental principle which is applicable to the foregoing facts, is stated in the conclupions of the Supreme Court in
Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, as follows:
"First. That a common carrier cannot -lawfully stipulate for
exemption from responsibility when such exemption is not just and
reasonable in the eye of the law. Second. Tl~at it is not just
and reasonable in the eye of the law for a common carrier to stipulate for exemption from responsibility for the negligence of himself
or his servants."
The exemption in the bill of lading from the liability of the
land carrier for fire or other casualty, does not include exemption
from liability for a casualty which was caused by the negligence
or want of care of the carrier in whose custody the property-was
at the time of the happening of the damage.
II. The presumption from the facts which are contained in the
agreed statement is, that the fire and injury were caused by the
negligence of the defendant. And this presumption was not
rebutted "when the thing is shown to be under the management
of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those wo have the
management use proper care; it affords reasonable evidence in
the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident
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arose from want of,care :" Scott v. Dock Co., 8 Hurlst. & Colt.

596; Tran8portationCo. v. Downeo, 21 Am. Law Rbg., N. S. 522;
Ro8e v. Stephens & Condit Tans. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 488. The
defendant was therefore liable to the plaintiff for the damage
occasioned by such negligence.
.III. The remaining question is, whether the clause in the bill
of lading, which provides that the carrier who is legally liable for
any damage shall have the benefit of any insurance that may have
been effected upon the damaged goods, shall be so construed as to
give the benefit of the insurance to a carrier whose negligence
caused the injury, or whether such a contract so constried is not
an unjust and unreasonable exemption from liability for negligence.
The argument of the plaintiffs is to the effect that such a contract
virtually protects the carrier from liability arising from his negli.
gence, because the owner of property in transit is compelled, as a
prudent business man, to insure against the accidental injuries for-,
which the carrier is not liable, and, therefore, if the contratt. is
valid, the carrier has indirectly, and covertly, but securely, protected himself against the injurious consequences of his want of
care by an insurance for which he did not pay, and on account
of which there is no evidence .of a reduction of the rates for
freight.
It does not seem to me that such a contract is unreasonable
because, 1st. It is not one of exemption from liability. The'
owner is under -no obligation .to insure; he is not compelled "to
furnish indemnity to the carrier; and if he insures, can make a
limited contract of insurance which does not cover losses through
the carrier's negligence. There is, therefore, no contract of exemption against liability for loss by negligence, no agreement that the
carrier shall be protected or be indemnified, but the contract
simply is that in the contingency of insurance, a consequent benefit
will, in case of loss, result to the carrier.
2d. It is not unfair to the owner. The carrier is at liberty to
insure his interest in the property intrusted to his care, and the
fact that he may obtain an indemnity from a third person, by means
of the owner's policy, is not unfair to the owner, unless the obtaining such indemnity is in reality made compulsory upon him,
because the owner "can equitably receive but one satisfaction" for.
the loss of his goods: Hart v. Railroad Co., 13 Met. 99. If it
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was a part of the bill of lading that the owner must insure for the
benefit of the carrier, such conditions would be unfair.
3d. The contract is not necessarily unfair to the insurer. At
common law, the owner who has been paid in full or in part, for
his, loss, by the insurance company, may sue the carrier upon the
contract of bailment, and as to so much of the amount recovered
from the carrier as is in excess of a full satisfaction of the loss,
the owner will be a trustee for the insurance company. It seems
that the effect of the clause in the bill of lading which is now
under consideration, is to provide that the owner, in such circumstances, is not a trustee for the insurance company but a trustee
for the carrier. If such a contract is entered into without fraudulent concealment of the facts from the insurers, of which there is
no evidence in this case, it cannot properly be considered unjust
or unreasonable, because' the insurance company obtains its remedy,
not by virtue of a contract of its own with a carrier, but through
the owner's cdntract, and its right depends upon or is subject to
the agreement made by the owner with the carrier, which he is at
liberty to make to suit his own interest, provided there is no
fraudulent concealment from the insurers. They can, in view of
this provision- in bills of lading, modify the contract which they
have heretofore customarily made with the insured, and the result
will probably be that the insurers will also make provisions in their
policies by virtue of which insurance on property in transit will
have a limited character.
In the absence of any contract on the subject, if the insured
owner accepts payment from the insurers, they "may use the name
of the assured in an action to Dbtain redress from the carrier whose
failure of duty caused the loss." The right rests upon "the doctrine of subrogation, dependent not at all upon privity of contract,
but worked out through the right of the creditor or owner." The
suit cannot be in the name of the insurers: Hall & Long v. Railroad Co., 13 Wall. 367; Hart v. Railroad Co., 13 Met. 99;
Aferaitile Nut. Ins. Co. v. Calebs, 20 N. Y. 173; Conn. Hut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Railroad Co., 25 Oonn: 256.
By the contract in question, the owner agrees, that, as between
him and the carrier, the latter, when he has paid for the loss, may
have the benefit of the insurance. This contract will probably interfere with the benefit which the insurer would otherwise obtain by
virtue of being subrogated to the rights of the owner, or of having
Vo.
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an equitable assignment of the owner's interest in the policy; but
the mere fact, in the absence of fraud, that the insurers may not
occupy the same position which they would have had if the provision had not been inserted, is not sufficient to justify an opinion
that the provision is unreasonable.
The amount of the premium and the amount receiyed by the
plaintiffs from the insurance are not given in the agreed btatement.
I am inclined to the opinion that the owner is only bound to
account to the carrier for the net avails of the insurance, and if
those avails were less than the value of the goods, 4 balance would
still he due from the defendant. ' But as the finding simply says
that the plaintiffs received from the insurers the full value of the.
flour, I cannot assume that the net avails were not a full indemnity

for the loss..
-The defendant is liable for the amount of the loss, deducting the
sum which the plaintiffs have already received by way of indemnity,
and as the entire amount of tfle loss has been paid, the -plaintiffs
are entitled, under the contract,- 6treceive nothing more. -..
Judgment-is to ;be entered for the defendant,'
The vital point involved in the decision of the principal case is, whether
an agreement between a carrier and
shipper, to the effect that, "It is further.
stipulated and agreed, that in case of
any loss or detriment or damage, done
to or sustained by any of the property
herein receipted for during such transportation, whereby any legal liabilityor
responsibility shall or may be incurred
* * * the carrier so liable shall have
the full benefit of any insurance that
may have been effected upon or on account of said goods," is a valid stipulation in law.The test of the validity of such a
stipulation is analogous to the test ofthe
ligality of any special rule or usage or
custom in a trade, and that is, its
reasonableness or general propriety for
the special branch of trade in which it
is assertid, and which the ordinary simplicity and common mercantile-convenience of that trade demap;d. In testing,
then, the validity or reasonableness of

the-above stipulation; it will

be con-

reaient to determine what the meaning
of the stipulatioi is, what actual or supposed duties-it is intended to relieve the
common carrier from performing, what
duties" teo. qmmon carrer owes to the
shipper at the common law, and how
the relations of shipper and carrier in
respecdt to those duties are altered by the
above stipulation.
In ascertaining the meaning of the
'above stipulation, the first question suggested is, what is the meaning of the
words "legal liability or responsibility"
referred to in, the stipulation. Are
these words intended to be restricted to
the carrier's "liability" for accident
'alone, or are they intended to include
"liability" for lose, caused as well by
the carrier's negligence as by accident t
According to the decision of Wyld v.
Pckjfrd, 8 M. & W. 443, the former
interpretation could very easily prevail.
In Peek v. Railway (o., 1O H. L. C.
498, BrACxmsuR, J., in alluding to the
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above case, said: "The judgment, how- carrier of the benefit of the shipper's
ever, was that the plea to the count in insurance, whether the liability or retrover was bad. 'This was on the sponsibility of the former arise from
ground, that on the weight of authority, negligence or accident.
Having thus determined the meaning
a notice in the terms stated in the plea,
viz. : that the carriers would not be of the "liability" or "responsibility"
responsible for loss or damage done to referred to in the above agreement, we
goods unless insured, did not make the may consider the general intent of the
carrier irresponsible for every loss, but above stipulation.
What do terms of the above stipuonly for such as occurred without negligence, whether gross or ordinary, and lation imply? The agreement stipulathe inadvertent mis-delivery admitted in ting that the carrier shall have the
the plea, might be even grossly negli- benefit of the shipper's insurance in all
gent though inadvertent." That learned cases where the former is liable or.
judge, however, questioned the sound- responsible for loss, is an agreement
ness of this construction, and remarked, compelling the shipper, where he sues
further on, "that the judgment in Wyld or has recovered damages from the
v. Pickford seems to me to proceed on carrier for the loss of a cargo, to hand
the ground that the authorities bound back to the carrier so much of the damthe court to put a construction on the ages as his insurance amounts to. Thus,
terms of the notice, that the carrier in every case i where the shipper has
'would not be responsible for loss or dam- insured, the carrier, by this set off, is
age,' making them mean, would notbe re- relieved from the responsibility for his
sponsible for loss or damage unless caused negligence, at least so far as the dam
by negligence. This certainly seems to ages he has inflicted are covered by the
me not the natural meaning of thd amount of insurance.
words, or the sense in which they would - We omit discussing a very important
be understood either by a carrier or his effect of this stipulation upon the shipcustomer; and though the weight of per, in respect to his relation to the
authority might, at the. time when insurer as to the latter's right of
Wyld v. Pickford was decided, compel subrogation; for it has been decided
one of the courts below to put this in Carstairs v. N. 6- T. Ins. Co. of
forced meaning on the words, .I think New York, 18 Fed. Rep. 473, in the
your lordships would hardly even then Circuit Court of Maryland, that the
have considered yourselves bound. to do insurer, having lost his right of subroso." In Hinton v. Dibbin, 2 Q. B. gation against the carrier, in conse646, however, later on, the question was quence of this stipulation, will be
again raised whether these words were to relieved from paying the amount of the
be understood as containing an implied insurance. Now it may be that where
exception of gross negligence, an'dthe the insurer has due notice of, and indecision of the court was, that the words sures, subject to this stipulation between
were to be understood in their natural shipper and carrier, he will be liable to
sense, as exempting the carrier from pay the insurance; but in all probaliability from negligence as well as acci- bility, having lost his right of subrogadent; and "this decision has always tion, he will be compelled to charge the
been acquiesced in;" per BLACKurD?, shipper increased rates of premium.
J., in Peek v. Railway Co., supra. But this we leave out of the discusThis stipulation,-then, under discussion, sion.
But a comprehensive view of the
we may assume, is to be construed as
an agreement for the transfer to the effect of -this stipulation must lead to
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the conclusion that, by means of this
set off of the shipper's insurance, the
carrier virtually intends to contract, in
every case, for exemption from responsibility for negligence or accident.
Now S~rPMeu, J., stated, in the principal case, that the above stipulation
was reasonable, because it was not
one of exemption from liability, sayig :
"The owner is under no obligation to
insure; he is not compelled to furnish
indemnity to the carrier, and if he
insures, can make a limited contract
of insurance which does not cover losses
through the carrier's negligence ; there
is, therefore, no contract of exemption
against liability for loss by negligence,
no agreement that the carridr may be
protected or indemnified, but the contract simply is, in the contingency of
insurance; a consequent benefit *Ul, in
case of loss, result to the carrier. ***
If it was a part of the bill of lading
that the owner, must insure for the
benefit of the carrier, such condition
would be unfair."
It is idle, however, to contend that
the stipulation is not a compulsory contract freeing the carrier from his liabiity for negligence, if not in all cases,
at least in a vast number of cases ; for,
as a fact r every one familiar with the
transportation of cargo,' is well aware
that shippers almost universally do
insure, and besides, the above stipulation of the bill of lading would be
simply meaningless, if shippers were
not in the cgnstant habit of effecting
insurance on their cargo. At all
events, is any agreement between shipper and carrier, exempting the latter
from the effects of his negligence, in any
case, a valid stipulation?
Having now ascertained the meaning
of the above contract between the shipper and carrier, and what duty it is
intended to free the carrier from performing, it will be necessary, in order
to consider the question of its reasonablendss, to find out how far the carrier

is, at common law, bound to answer
for a breach of this duty to the shipper,
or, in other words, to what extent the
carrier may make with the shipper S
special contract of exemption from negligence.

-

In every system of law with which
we are acquainted, the contract or the
carrier involves the obligation -of apply-,
ing reasonable care and diligence in the
custody and conveyance of the thing to
be carried. No doubt it was always by
our lawcompetent to a carrier in respect
of articles as to which he did not hold
himself oat as a common carrier, to
insist on a special.contract, and by its
terms to limit the extent of his, liability. But the fact that, in the absence of any special agreement, which,
of course would supersede the law,"
the -obligation to use due care auit
diligence with the subject-matterf the
bailment attached, by operatiot'of law,
upon the contract to carry, shbws that,
in the eye of the law, it is deemed rea.
sonable that thii obligation should fbrm
part of the duty.of the carrier. Per
Coinnur, C. J., in Pek V. Railiwea
Co., '10 H. L. C. 553. And in the
same case BLAORBURN, J., "says: " He
was also bound to receive goods'tender64
to him for carriage, and was liable for
an action if he refused 'to receive theii
without reasonable excuse; and such
action may still be maintained. * * *
But many years ago a practice began
by which carriers sought to restrict their
liabilities by giving notice that they
would not be answerable for loss,
except on conditions limiting the extent of their common-law liability as
carriers." * * * 1, Still, however," he
added, quoting SToit, J.. "it is to be
understood that common carriers cannot
by any special agreement exempt themselves .from all responsibility, so as to
evade altogether the salutary'policyof
the common law. They cannot, therefore, by a special notice exempt themselves from all responsibility in cases of
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gross negligence or fraud, or by demanding an, exorbitant price, compel
the owner of the goods to yield to
unjust and oppressive limitations of
their rights." Now it is to be borne in
mind that the position of the carrier is
greatly altered by the introduction of
railways, and the shipper no longer
stands on the same ground of equality
with him as formerly. On page 555,
of the above case, Cocxnumr, C. J.,
said: "There cannot be a doubt that,
practically speaking, the introduction
of railways has destroyed the competition which formerly existed, and the
effect of which was to secure to the
goods-owner fair and reasonable terms
from the carrier, between distant termini. Between some, indeed, where
there happens to be more than one line
of railway, as, for instance, between
London and York, and London and
Exeter, some competition may be said
to exist, but over the greater portion of
the country, and even on the lines to
which I have just referred, between all
the intermediate places, it is idle to talk
of competition as practically existing.
On the other hand, the absence of other
means of conveyance, as well as the
increased rapidity of transport, compels
the owner of goods, at least for all the
purposes of business, to resort to railway
conveyance. He is thus at the mercy
of the carrier, and has no alternative
but to submit to any terms, however
unjust and oppressive, which the latter
may see fit to impose."
In Epress Co. v. Caldwell, 21 Wall.
267, STRONG, J., observed: "Common
carriers do nordeal with their employers
on equal terms; there is, in a very important sense, a necessity for their
employment. In many cases they are
corporations chartered for the promotion of public convenience. They have
possession of the railways, canals and
means of transportation on the river,
they can and do carry at much cheaper
rates Than those private carriers de-
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mand. They have on all important
routes supplanted private carriers; in
fact, they are without competition except
as between themselves, and that they
are thus, is in most cases a consequence
of advantages obtained from the public.
It is, therefore, just that they are not
allowed to take advantage of their
powers, and of the necessities of the
public, to exact exemption from that
measure of duty which public policy,
demands."
And the same learned
judge, in the course of his opinion in
the above case, stated, it was now the
settled law, " that the responsibility of
the common carrier may be limited by
express agreement made with his employer at the time of the accepting goo ls
for transportation, provided the limitation be such that the law can recognise
as reasonable and not inconsistent with
sound public policy."
Having now seen that, by the common law, the carrier could not exempt
himself from the responsibility of his
own negligence, and that the carrier is
not at a greater disadvantage now than
formerly, let us endeavor to ascertain
whether the carrier can legally make such
a stipulation of exemptiot as the above,
and for this purpose let us examine the
law as laid down in the modern cases.
Before discussing the cases it must
be observed that the fact of the carrier's ability to insure against any loss,
though caused by his own negligence, is
not pertinent to this question, since he
owes no duty to the insurer and pays a
consideration, while he always owes a
duty to his shipper, and besides pays no
consideration when the latter insures.
It is thus quite clear that the carrier's
ability to insure himself cannot at all
affect the question, as to whether he
can, in any case, either compel the
shipper to insure for him, or get the
benefit of the shipper's insurance, and
so be relieved of his responsibiliiy for
negligence.
It is-also to be observed that that line
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of cases has no place here, which is to
the effect, that the carrier may make
certain reasonable contracts with the
shipper, not excusing negligence, but
limiting the time in which the shipper
may bring suit, as, for instance, in
Express Co. v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. 264,
where it was held that a contract limiting the shipper's right to sue in case
of loss to ninety days, was valid, as it
was a mare statute of limitation. See,
also, Wolf v. West Union Tel. Co., 62
Penn. St. 83; Lewis v. Great We.
Railway Co., 5 H. & N. 867; Young
v. W st. Union Tel. Co., 34 N. Y.
(S. C.) 890.. So in Simons v. Great
West. Railway Co., 18,C. D. 805,
where two rates of charges were offered
the shipper, and the contract was that
the company would not be liable in the
ease of special or reduced rates ; or
where the agreement is that the freight
shall be prepaid, or else no'liabllty. Or
where the articles to be transported are
of extraordinary value or of dangerous
composition, such as a very valuable
animal, the expense of loss being greatly
disproportioned to the freight allowed;
.'orwhere the bulk of the article carried
is in immense disproportion to its value,
as a package of diamonds, gold, &c.
The cases on the point under discussion were ably and eXhaustively reviewed by BRAwLr, J., in Railroad
Co. v. Locwood, 17 Wall. 357, the
facts of which are stated, infra, on page
303, and we shall state his conclusions
therefrom. On page 367, he said:
"A review of the cases by the courts
of New York, shows that though they
have carried the power of the common
carrier to make special contracts to the
extent of enabling him to exonerate
himself from the effects of even gross
negligence, yet that this effect has never
been given to a contract general in its
terms. So that if we only felt bound
by these precedents, we could, perhaps,
find no authority for reversing the judgment in this -case. But on a question

"of general law, the federal Pourts administering justice in New York, have
equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction with
the courts of that state. And in deciding
a case which involves a question on which
the courts of New York have expressed
such diverse views, and have so recently,
and with such slight preponderancy of
judicial suffrage, come to the conclusion
that -theyhave, we should not feel satisfied without being A£le to place our
decision upon grounds satisfactory to
ourselves and resting upon what we
consider sound principles of law. In
passing, however, it is apposite to call
attention to the testimony of an authoritative witness as to the operation and
effect of the recent decisions referred to.
"The fruits of this rule," says Judge
Divis, "are already being gathered in
increasing accidents, through the decreasing care and vigilance on the part
of these corporations: and they will
continue to be reaped until a just sense
of public policy shall lead to legislative
restriction upon the powers to make
these kinds of contracts :" Stinson v.
N. Y. Cent. Railroad Co., 32 N. ".
37. * * * In Pennsylvania, it is settled by a long course of decisions, that a
common carrier cannot, by notice of a
special contract, limit his liability so as
to exonerate him from responsibility for
his own negligence or misfeasance, or
that of his servants and agent&: Laingv.
Colder, 8 Penn. St. 479. See P. 4- A.
Railroad Co. v. Baldouf, 8 Penn. St.
67 ; Goldey v. P. Railroad Co., 80 Id.
242; Powell v. P. Railroad Co., 32 Id.
414; P. Railroad Co. v; Henderson, 51
Id. 315 ; Farnham.v. C. t- A. Railroad
.Co., 55 Id. 58; Express Co. v. Sands,
Id. 140; Empire Trans. Co. T. Wamsutta Oil Co., 63 Id. 14. "The doctrine
is firmly settled," .says Chief Justice
THourso, in Farnham v. Camden 6Amboy Railroad Co., 55 Penn. St. 62,
"that a common carrier cannot limit
his liability so as to cover his own or
his servant's negligence." * * *. In
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Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Henderson,
51 Penn. St. 315, a drover's pass stipulated for an immunity of the company
in case of injury from negligence of
its servants or otherwise. The court,
Judge READ, delivering the opinion,
after a careful review of the Pennsylvania decisions, says: "This endorsement relieves the company from all
liability for any cause whatever, for any
loss or injury to the person or the property however it may have been occasioned ; and our doctrine, settled by the
above decision, made upon great deliberation, declares that such a release is
no excuse for negligence."
The Ohio cases are very decided on
this subject, and reject all attempts of
the carrier to excuse his own negligence
or that of his servants: Jones v. Voorhees, 10 Ohio 145 ; Davidson v. Graham, 2 Ohio St. 131 ; Grahamv. Davis,
4 Id. 362; Wilson v. Hamilton, Id.
722,; Welsh v. P., F. W. 4- C. Raidivad Co., 10 Id. 75 ; ClevelanrRailroad
Go. v. Curran, 19 Id. I; C.H. 4"D.
Railroad Co. v. Pontius, Id. 231 ; Knowlton v. Erie Railroad Co., Id. 260.
In Maine, whilst it is held that a
common carrier may,-by special contract, be exempted from responsibility
from loss occasioned by natural causes,
such as weather, fire, heat, frost, &c.,
-Allebrown v. G. T. Railroad Co., 55 Me.
462, yet in a case where it was stipulated that a railroad company should be
exonerated from all damages that might
happen to any horses or cattle that
might be sent over the road, and that
the owner should take the risk of all
such damages, the court held, that the
company were not thereby excused from
the consequences of their negligence.
See Sager v. Portsmouth, 21 Me. 228,
238.
To the same purport, it was held in
Massachusetts, in the late case of School
1)istrict v. Boston, 4c. Railroad C.,
102 Mass. 552-556, where the defendant set up a special contract that certain
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iron castings were taken at the owner's
risk of fracture or injury during the
course of transportation, loading and
unloading, and the courts say: "The
special contract here set up is not alleged, and could not by law be permitted, to exempt the defendants from
liability from injuries by their own negligence."
To the same purport, likewise, are
many other decisions of the state courts.
See rnd. Railroad Co. v. Allen, 31 Ind.
394; Ifich. South. Railroad Co. v.
Heaton, Id. 397, note; .Flynn v. P.,
W. 4- B. Railroad Co., Houston 417;
Orndorff v. Adams Ex. Co., 3 Bush
194; Swindler v. Hdliard 6- Brooks,
2 Rich. (S. C.) 286 ; Berry v. Cooper,
28 Ga. 543; Steele v. Townsend, 37
Ala. 247 ; Suth. Ex.Co. v. Crook, 44
Id. 468; Whitesides v. Thur1kill, 12 S.
& M. 599 ; South. Lx. Co. v. Moon, 39
Miss. 822; N. 0. H. Insurance Co.
v. N., 6-c., RailroadCo., 20 La. Ann.
302.
The Federal law is expressed in Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, in
the very able opinionbyB,?ALEY, J.,just
adverted to. There, a drover with cattle
on a through train, was compelled at
Buffalo to sign an agreement to attend
to the loading, transporting, and unloading of them, and to take all risks of
injury to them and of personal injury to
himself, or to whomsoever went with the
cattle, and l4e received "a drover's
pass," stating that he had shipped sufficient cattle to Albany to entitle him to a
free pass. In an action for injury caused
by the company's negligence, it was held,
affirming the court below, that a common
carrier does not drop his character as
such, merely by entering into a contract
limiting his responsibility, that the stipulation in the case was illegal, being unjust and unreasonable in the eye of the
law, and that the carrier being guilty of
negligence, was responsible in damages.
The common law of England was
carefully considered in Peek v. Railway
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Co., 10 H. L. C. 493. And Br.acx- the English courts took their departure
3uax, J., said the law was correctly from it."
In Peek v. Railway Co., supra, the
stated by STORY, J., in his Law of Bailments, and is substantially the same as owner of some marble chimney-pieces,
the law in America, up to 1832. In desired to send them to London, and the
1832, however, the well-known "carriers
agent of the railway company stated,
act" was passed in England, which was as a condition, that the company would
construed by the courts, so as to permit not be responsible for damage to the
the carrier to restrict by special contract, 'gods sent, unless their value was
his own liability for negligence, fraud or declared, and insured, the rate of insurmisconduct, till finally the climax was ance being at ten per cent. on the tlereached in Crr v. L. 6- Y. Rmlway Co., dared value. , The goods were then sent
7 Exeh. 707. In this case plaintiffsigned "uninsured."
The goods were injured
a ticket of a company, which was to and an action for damages was brought;
transport his horse, to the effect that he the cause was first heard before EaXL,
would undertake "all risks of convey- J., in 1858, who thought, inter alia, that
ance whatsoever, and that the company the condition was a reasonable one. On
would not be responsible for any injury a rule to show cause, subsequentlyin the
or damage however caused ;" and it was Court of Queen's Bench, before Lord
held, though the horse was killed by CANPBzTL, EnLE, J., and CRu-o'e0-,o;
gross negligence by the defendants X., the condition was held to bd unservants, that the plaintiff could not reasonable. ERI., J., dissenting. The
-recover. In 1854, however, the Rail- decision of the Queen's Bench, was
way and Canal Traffic Act of 17. & 18 on appeal, reversed in the Exchequer,
Vict. c. 31, intervened, asthecompanies Chamber, byPou~oon, C. B., MAani,
sought "to evade altogether Me sal"u
WArsoN, CHAISNLL, BE., -and Winpolicy of the common law." The material Xs J.; WmuANS, J., was of contrary
words of the act ran "every such com- opinion. The case then went to the
pAny * * * shall be liable for the loss House of Lords who ordered to be put to
of,- or for any injury done to any horses, the judges, inter alia, the question: "is
cattle, or other animals, or to any articles, the condition, that the company sliorld
goods, or things * * * occasioned by not be responsible for injury to the goods
the neglect or default of such company or unless the same were declared and insuted
its servants, notwithstanding any notice, according to their value, a just and
condition or dexlaration * * * given by reasonable condition, within the true
such company contrary thereto. * * * intent and meaning of the 17 & 18
Provided, always, that nothing herein Vict. c. 31, sec. 7." The judges were
contained shall be construed to prevent divided in opinion. In the negative were,
the said companies from making such Coomauiwi Chief Justice of the Queen's
conditions with respect to the receiving, Bench, BxAcxnmu,
and C oxproN
forwarding, and delivering of any of the JJ. In the affirmative were Poiwox,
said animals, articles, goods, or things, as C. B., M~nTnN B., and WiLr.s and
shall be adjudged bythe court or judge, WX.tA3,
JJ. The condition was
before whom any question relating there- held in the House of Lords, to be
to, is tried to be just and reasonable."
unjust and unreasonable, by Lords
And, "the truth is," as BRADrz, 3., WESTBIUY, C., CRANWOETH and
remarked in Railroad Company v. Lock- WExsszLEDALE, Lord CHELmssoan disood, supra, "that this statute did little senting.
more than bring back the law to the
This case, although decided on the
original position in which it stood before wording of the statute, is merely a reiter-
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ation of the principles of the common
law as it existed up to 1832, when the
Carriers' Act was passed and is extremely
pertinent to the point under discussion.
The other cases which are applicable
to this point are the Pluenix Ins. Co. v.
Erie West. Trans. Co., Lawson on
Carriers 382 '(1879), U. S. District
Court, decided by DYER, D. J. : Merch.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Calebs, 20 New York
173; and Carstairs v. Merch. 6- Trade
Ins. Co., 1.8 Fed. Reporter 473. These
cases virtually approve of the rule laid
down in the principal case. In .3erdi.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Calebs, supra, however,
it is to be noticed that the court in delivering its opinion, especially reverted
to the fact that "this benefit was secured
to them in consideration, in part, of the
reduced rates of the price of transportation of the goods, of which the insured
had the benefit." And besides no negligence was shown in the case. So that
perhaps this case is not altogether in
point, and the principal case depends for
all authority upon the above federal decisions of the lower courts just adverted to.
It may, perhaps, be not out of place to
give as an illustration of the effects that
might follow, if this stipulation is valid,
the case of a common carrier declining
to be responsible for injury to passengers,
unless insured against accident, &c., or
insisting on the benefit of any insurance
passengers might have against accident.
It may be well here to observe the
unfortunate consequences as respects the
shippers' rights, which must follow if the
deciion in the principal case is correct.
In the first place, the railroad company
being restricted to impose a maximum
rate for freight, would be permitted in
certain instances to compel the shipper
to pay the maximum rate as well as the
additional sum for insurance for the
carrier's benefit. Again, as the stipulation gives the carrier the benefit of the
insurance, wherever the carrier is liable
he may thus be relieved, not only against
Vor. X][X.-9
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gross negligence, but against the felonious acts of negligence on the part of
his servants. Again, finally, as was
observed by CocKuRN, C. J., in Peek
v. Railway Co., supra, "a further reason
for preventing railway companies from
too easily divesting themselves of responsibility of negligence is to be found in the
fact with which everybody's experience
unhappily makes us familiar that loss or
injury too frequently arises from the
negligence of some of the numerous
servants whom railway companies are
under the necessity of employing. Itis
only by the utmost vigilance on the part
of those to whom the management of railway affairs is committed, that this evil
can be kept at its lowest point, ano
the effect of sanctioning such a condition
as the present (one of compulsory insurance or absence of liability) will obviously be either to compel those who
have goods to be conveyed to submit to
undue exaction, or, in the event of their
refusing to pay the required premium, to
deprive them of the protection which the
interest of the railway companies, in
preventing negligence on the part of their
servants would otherwise secure them."
But in P. 4- R. IBailroad Co. v. Derby,
14 How. 486, Gnizn, J., said "where
carriers undertake to convey persons
by the powerful but dangerous agency
of steam, public policy and safety require
that they be held to the greatest possible
care and diligence * * * any negligence
in such cases, may well deserve the epithet of "gross ;" and these are in accordance with remarks of Dvis, J.,
above."
It is true that it may be contended
that it is an invasion of the private rights
of individuals, and contrary to sound
policy to allow those who have made a
foolish contract, to ask to be relieved
from the operation of its terms; but
when we consider that these conditions
are usually imposed suddenly, at the
moment of delivery of the goods by the
shipper, when mature reflection as to
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their import is not possible, when often
their terms are not clearly understood, or
are printed in some obscure place in the
bill of lading, often in type too small to
be understood, or at a moment when
repudiation of them is annoying and
irksome to the customer; when the shipper and carrier no longer stand on the
same ground of equality, as, since the
introduction of railways, all competition
is virtually, done away with ; it certainly
does not appear harsh or improper for a

OF JERSEY CITY.

court to examine the propriety or legality
of such stipulations at a subsequent
period, and if they shall appear to be
unjust and unreasonable, to hold them
to be void, astd relieve the shipper from
the effect of their terms.
Whether the rule decided in the principal case be sound in principle or not,
there certainly does appear to be equal if
not much greater authority for the assertion of a contrary doctrine.
.ARTHUR BIDDLE.

United States Circuit Court, District of New Jersey.
ROUEDE v. MAYOR,
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A bonafide holder of municipal bonds cannot be prejudiced by the fact that the
merely formal requirements of the statute authorizing their issue were not complied with.
Overdue and unpaid coupons attached to municipal bonds are not sufficient to put
a purchaser upon inuuiry, so as to charge him with notice of defects of title.

IN debt.
Robert 0. Babbitt, for plaintiff.
Allan L. McDermott, for defendant.
NIxoN, J.-The principle is well settled by the Supreme Court
that, in a suit by a bonafide holder against a municipal corporation
to recover the amount of coupons due or bonds issued under authority conferred by law, no questions of form merely, or irregularity
or fraud or misconduct on the part of the agents of the corporation,
can be considered. The only matters left open in this case for
inquiry are, 1. The authority to issue the bonds by the laws of the
state, and 2. The bonafides of the holder: .BastLincoln v. Daven-

port, 94 U. S. 801; Pompton v. Cooper Union; 101 Id. 196;
Copper v. Mayor, etc., of ersey City, 15 Yroom 634.
This suit is brought upon twenty bonds of the defendant corporation, of the denomination of $1000 each, sixteen of which are dated

July 1st 1873, and the remaining four October 1st 1873.

The

recital appears upon the face of the sixteen that they were issued
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under a resolution of the board of finance and taxation of Jersey
City, of the date of June 1st 1873, and in conformity with an act
of the legislature of New Jersey, entitled "An act to reorganize
the local government of Jersey City," approved March 31st 1871,
and the several supplements thereto, and under the second section
of the supplement of April 4th 1873. , The recital upon the face of
the other four bonds is that they also are issued by the board of
finance and taxation; under the authority of section 156 of the city
charter. An examination of the charter and supplements referred
to, renders it certain that ample legislative authority was granted
for the issue of the bonds. It is of no importance in the pending
suit whether or not the city officials complied with all the requirements of the law in the method or manner of their issue. If there
was any dereliction on their part, as was so strongly urged by the
counsel for the defendant on the argument, the rights of a bonafide
holder are not to be prejudiced thereby.
Is the plaintiff such holder? The evidence is quite meager in
regard to the facts. But I gather the following, either from the
testimony of the witnesses, or from the admissions of counsel at the
hearing. Just after the panic of 1873, Jersey City was found to
be unable to meet a number of matured claims, which were being
pressed for payment. The board of finance and taxation, in which
was vested the power of issuing the bonds of the city, made arrangements with a number of holders of claims to pay them with bonds
of the city at par. These were issued, and after consultation with
the mayor, it was agreed that they should be delivered" into the
hands of Alexander D. Hamilton, Jr., the city treasurer, who was
to use them in settlement of the claims as they were presented.
Mr. Lockwood, chairman of the committee of finance and taxation,
states that the treasurer had a list of certain specified claims, which
consisted largely of improvement certificates, and upon presentatioil
of these certificates, as specified, he was to make the exchange in
bonds and settle the difference in cash." Instead of using the bonds
for the purpose designated, the treasurer absconded in the fall of
1878, carrying with him city bonds of the par value of $47,000.
They were all of the denomination of $1000 each, and the coupons
on which this suit is brought were attached to twenty of them.
Hamilton turned up in Mexico, where, it is presumed, he negotiated
the bonds. The next information we have respecting them is, that on
May 10th 1879, the plaintiff, then residing at Matamoras, in Mexico,
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purchased for the sum of $18,000, twenty of the bonds of one M.
Jesus De Lira, a life-long resident of Matamoras-a gentleman who
had been a general merchant, but had then retired from general
business, and only undertook such occasional matters as presented
themselves from time to time. The plaintiff, on his examination,
states that he had been acquainted with De Lira fourteen years,
and *upon being asked whether he took any steps at the time of the
purchase to ascertain if the bonds were issued by the defendants,
he replied:
"The bonds appeared, on their face, to have been issued by the
proper officers, and I believed that I should have nothing to do but
transmit them for payment to my correspondents in New York. I
had Inown Mr. Lira for a long time, and had many business dealings with him, without ever having any difficulty or reason to mistrust him. It sufficed, therefore, that he should offer me these
bonds as good bonds, for me to accept them without hesitationthere being nothing on the face of the bonds, or in the circumstances
under which they were presented, to arouse my suspicions."
This is the plaintiff's statement of the circumstances under which
the sale was made. It stands uncontradicted. The burden of
establishing the defence is upon the defendant, and unless there is
something about the bonds which should have put the plaintiff upon
inquiry, he is entitled to recover.
The only fact upon which the defendant's counsel seemed to rely
on the argument was, that at the time of the purchase there were
attached to the bonds eleven overdue coupons, representing halfyearly amounts of matured interest, and amounting in the aggregate to $7700. Being questioned in regard to these, the plaintiff
further testified that, having no suspicion he made no inquiries in
regard to the bonds, except that, observing these overdue coupons,
he asked the vendor why they had not been collected, and received
for answer that "they were probably not payable yet." Was the
mere presence of these unpaid and overdu'e coupons sufficient of
itself to put the purchaser upon inquiry ? Or rather, in view of the
decisions of the Supreme Court on this point, was his neglect to
institute further inquiries proof of bad faith on his part ?
In Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. 110, the Supreme Court with
great deliberation reiterated the settled law, that coupon bonds of
the ordinary kind, payable to bearer, passed by mere delivery;
that a purchaser of them in good faith was unaffected by want of
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title in the vendor; and that the burden of proof on a question
of such faith lies on the party who assails the possession. Mr.
Justice SWAYNE, sreaking for the whole court, says: "Suspicion
of defect of title, ol he knowledge of circumstances which would
excite suspicion in thk mind of a prudent man, or gross negligence
on the part of the take.- at the time of the transfer, will not defeat
his title."
Again, in Cromwell v. County of Sac, 96 U. S. 58, the same
court, by Mr. Justice FIELD, says: "As with other negotiable
paper, mere suspicion that there may be a defect of title in its
holder, or knowledge of circumstances which would excite suspicion
as to his title in the mind of a prudent man, is not sufficient to impair
the title of the purchaser. That result will only follow where there
has been bad faith on his part."
In the'last case the question was also considered whether overdue and unpaid coupons for interest, attached to a municipal bond
which had several years to run, rendered the bond and the subsequently maturing coupons dishonored paper, so as to subject them
in the hands of a purchaser for value to defences good against the
original holder. The court held that their presence had no such
effect, asserting that "the simple fact that an instalment of interest is overdue and *unpaid, disconnected from other facts, is not
sufficient to affect the position of one taking the bonds and subsequent coupons, before their maturity, for value, as a bona fide
purchaser."
In Parsons v. Jackson, 99 U. A. 434, the payment of the bonds
of a railway company in Louisiana was in controversy. The bonds
had never been issued by the company, but had been seized and
carried away during the late rebellion. They were drawn payable
to bearer either in London, New York or New Orleans, and the
president of the company was authorized to fix the place of payment
by his endorsement thereon. When stolen they contained no such
endorsement. They were offered for sale and were sold for a very
small consideration in the market of New York, with due and
unpaid coupons for several years attached to them. The court
held that the absence of the required endorsement was a defect
which deprived the bonds of the character of negotiability, and that
the purchaser was affected with notice of their invalidity. Mr.
Justice BRADLEY, speaking for the court, asserted "that the presence of the part due and unpaid coupons, was itself an evidence
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of dishonor, sufficient to put the purchaser on inquiry." But in
the subsequent c6se of Railway Co. v. Sprague, 103 U. S. 756,
this expression of the learned justice is commented on, qualified
and restricted, and it was again held, and may nowbe accepted as
the law, that overdue and unpaid interest coupons attached to
municipal bonds, are not in themselves sufficient to put the purchaser upon inquiry.
Let judgment be entered for the plaintiff.
The issue of municipal bonds is much
more easily prevented than their payment can be avoided. After they have
been sold to bona fide purchasers, the
rights of the latter enable them to compel payment, however irregularly the
bonds may have been issued, if the
irregularity be not such as to render
them void. It is intended in this note
to indicate some of the grounds of restraining an issue of such bonds.
Special Authority to Issue Bonds.-It
is not infrequently the case, especially
in the new states and territories, to
authorize municipalities, by a special or
private act of the legislature, to issue
court-house, railway aid, and other
bonds. Where a special act is passed
it is believed to be operative as a repeal
of any general statutes upon the same
subject, at least, pro tanto, or so long as
the special act shall continue in operation. All formalities required by the
special act are in the nature of conditions precedent, performance of which
is essential to the lawful issue of the
bonds under that act. For example, if
the special act require a vote to be taken
within a given time, this is imperative.
It must be performed, or the bonds cannot be issued if objection is made before
they are put in circulation, although
afterwards, perhaps, the objection might
not be in time: Essex Co. Railroad Co.
v. Town of Lunenburg, 49 Vt. 143;
McCoy v. Briant, 11 Chi. Leg. News
84; Leavenworth, 4-c., Railroad Co. v.
County Ct. of Platte Co., 42 Mo. 171 ;
City v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 477 ; Steines v.

Franklin County, 48 Mo. 167. When
the special act is once acted upon it is
exhausted, and unless authority be given
to act under it a second or other time,
it cannot be proceeded under again:
2ll. Midland Railroad Co. v. Waynesville, 6 Rep. 457 ; State v. County Ct.
of Daviess Co., 64 Mo. 30.
General Authority to Issue Bonds.Of course, where general statutes authorize a municipality to issue bonds,
there is no doubt of its power to do so.
But how is it where power is given only
to borrow money for building a courthouse, jail or for other county purposes ?
It has been decided that authority to
borrow carries with it power to issue
bonds: Myer v. City of Muscatine, I
Wall. 384 ; Commonwealth v. Pittsburg,
41 Penn. St. 278 ; Seybert v. City of
Pittsburgh, 1 Wall. 272; Rogers v.
Burlington, 3 Id. 654. This is possibly
the proper view for a court to take when
it is sought as against a bonafide holder
to invalidate bonds, as being ultra vires.
But so liberal a construction of the word
"borrow" ought not to be given when
it is sought to restrain the issue of the
bonds before they have been put in circulation.
In Lewis v. Board of Co. Com. of
Sherman Co., 5 Fed. Rep. 269, it is
decided that a law authorizing the electors of a county to " borrow money" for
the erection of a court-house, does not
authorize them to issue bonds for that
purpose, although it was intimated that
the authority to issue bonds as an evidence of indebtedness might, perhaps,
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follow as an incident of the right to borrow money, but in that case the amount
of money borrowed should equal the
amount for which the bonds call. Said
Judge D uxey: "It must be observed
that the authority here conferred on the
county commissioners is to borrow money
to build a court-house. The law does
not authorize the people to vote bonds to
erect the building. They may, by their
votes, empower the commissioners to
borrow money for the purpose in question, but they cannot authorize the commissioners to issue bonds for such a
purpose, and have them hawked around
the, county and sold to A., B. and C.,
to raise money at a ruinous discount for
any such a purpose."
"It is one thing to authorize the borrowing of money to build a court-house
when needed, but it is another and very
different thing to vote for the issue of
bonds therefor, when the law does not
authorize it. It is true, if the people, by
a proper vote, should authorize the commissioners to borrow money, that, on
receiving the money, a bond or other
e'dence of indebtedness might be given
for the payment of the money when due,
under the terms of the loan. This
would, perhaps, follow as an incident to
the right to borrow. But, even then,
the amount of money so borrowed should
equal the amount for which the bond
was given, otherwise there would be no
end to the fraudulent practices of both
officers and purchasers of bonds. Such
a practice cannot be encouraged, and it
is the duty of the courts to close the
doors against it. If then the law does
not authorize the voting of bonds for
any such a purpose as building a courthouse, then the authority to borrow
money cannot be enlarged by the commissioners or the people so as to include
the right to issue bonds and sell them at
such price as can be procured therefor,
when such authority has been withheld
by the law-making power. This view
is fully supported by a case recently de-

cided by the Supreme Court (Scipio v.
Wright, 101 U. S. 665)." Lewis v.
Commissioners, supra.
The Election.-It is not unusual to
require a vote of the people to precede
an issue of bonds. In such case the law
must provide for an election, for the
people possess in themselves no inherent
right to hold an election for any purpose
unless authorized so to do by statute.
Thus, it has been decided, that where
certain persons were chosen county officers in an unorganized county in a territory, by a public meeting without the
shadow of legal right or authority, and
commissioned as such by the governor,
who also acted without any right or authority, they were usurpers, and an
election held under their authority was
void: Daly v. Estabrook, 1 Bartlett
299. In this case the rule was laid
down that no valid election could be
held in an unorganized county. In
Zfeune v. Weller, I1 Cal. 49, it is
decided that an election cannot take
place without statutory regulations, and
that all the efficacy given to the act of
casting a ballot, is derived from the lawmaking power through legislative enactment. Therefore the legislature must
provide for and regulate the conduct of
an election, or there can be none. See,
also, People v. MIartin, 12 Cal. 409 ;
Sawyer v. Haydon, I Nev. 75 ; State v.
Collins, 2 Id. 351.
In Attorney-General v. Board of Supervisors, 11 Mich. 63, a bill was filed
to enjoin proceedings to remove a county
seat. The law prescribed that the assent of a majority of the electors of the
county voting thereon should be requisite
to remove the county seat, and that the
proposition should be submitted "at the
next township meeting to the vote of
the electors of such county." In the
county were the cities of St. Clair and
Huron, neither of which had township
meetings, but charter elections instead,
it was held, 1. That. their charter elections could not be considered as town-
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ship elections. 2. That inasmuch as
the law did not provide for the submission of tue question at charter elections
in such cities, such a submission was
void, and the award of the injunction
was affirmed.
It is clear, therefore, that the law
must provide for the election at which
the question as to voting bonds, etc.,
shall be -submitted, and if the election
oe not provided for, the submission is
void.
What must be submitted at the Election.
-What shall be submitted to the people
at the election is always provided by the
statute, and its requirements in this respect must be fairly complied with. A
deficiency in the notice for the election
in any substantial and material matter
will invalidate the issue of the bonds.
Thus, frequently the statute requiies the
amount of the tax to be levied to pay the
bonds to be stated in the notice of the election. This requirement will not be filled
by stating the amount of the tax to be
levied as a certain per cent. per annum
on the county valutiaon. It is the amount
of tax to be levied, not the proportion,
that must be stated. And the persons to
whom is given the authority to fix the
amount cannot delegate their power to
any one else. There are several cases
illustrating these propositions. In one
the legislature had authorized the commissioners of a county to subscribe for
shares of the capital stock of a railway
company, but the act required the
amount to be subscribed for to be designated by a grand jury of the county.
The grand jury authorized a subscription "to an amount not exceeding
$150,000."
The commissioners subscribed for $150,000, and issued bonds
for that sum. The court enjoined the
railway company from selling the bonds
in its possession, and ordered their restitution to the county, principally on the
ground that they were issued without
authority-the grand jury instead of
deciding the amount themselves, having

transferred the decision to the county
commissioners. The court held that a
discretionary power to subscribe for
stock could not be transferred to, or
exercised by, any other person or body
than the one to whom it was granted:
Mercer (Jo. v. -itis. 4- Erie Railroad
Co., 27 Penn. St. 389.
A law authorized the Saline County
Court to. subscribe for railway stock,
but provided that the subscription
should not be made unless a majority
of the taxpayers should vote for it,
"specifying the amount."
The order
of the court, submitting the question to
the people, called on them to vote for
or against an amount "not exceeding
$70,000," leaving the precise amount
undetermined. The entry in the records
of the county court, subsequent to the
vote, deelared that the election resulted'
IIin favor of levying a tax of $70,000,
to subscribe the same to the capital
stock of the Lexington & St. Louis Railroad." It was held, on mandamus to
compel the issue of the bonds, and to
compel the levy of a tax for their payment, that such entry was not a conclusive finding by the court of the fact
that the taxpayers voted to subscribe
the specific sum of $70,000, but that it
showed merely that- the question submitted had received a majority of the
votes ; that the bonds of a county could
be made valid only by a substantial
compliance with the law that authorizes
their issue, and that the failure of thi
voters to specify their amount in the
case at bar, rendered the bonds issued
in pursuance of such vote invalid: State
v. Saline Co. Court, 45 Mo. 242.
In Detroit, Ell, R. 4- 1. Railway Co.
v. Bears, 39 Ind. 602, the statute required the amount of tax to be raised to
pay the bonds, to be specified both in the
petition for and the notice of the election,
"not exceeding, however, two per centun upon the amount of taxable property
of such county," etc. 'BusKiux, C. J.,
said: "The petition did not specify
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any amount. It asked for two per cided by the United States Supreme
cent. on the taxable property of the Court, Mr. Justice FiELD saying that,
township.
Two per cent. upon the " of the right of resident taxpayers to
taxables of the township is a specific invoke the interposition of a court of
proportion but not a specific amount. equity to prevent an illegal dispositicn
The amount of taxables varies every of the moneys of the county, or the illegal
year, and the amount would not be the creation of a debt which they, in common
same in any two successive years. No with other property holders of the county,
year is mentioned in the petitiom, and it may otherwise be compelled to pay, there
might mean the current year or the year is, at this day, no serious question.
preceding, upon which the tax had re- The right has been recognised by the
cently been paid. This uncertainty is state courts in numerous cases, and from
fatal. It is the amount that is required the nature of the powers exercised by
to be specific and not the per centum. municipal corporations, the great danger
In the first section of the said act a clear of; their abuse and the necessity of prompt
distinction is made between the amount action to prevent irremediable injuries,
and the per centum, for it is provided it would seem eminently proper for
that the amount shall be specified, which courts of equity to interfere, upon the
amount shall not exceed two per centum application of the taxpayers of a county,
upon the taxable property of the pre- to prevent the consummmation of a
ceding year. It is contended by the wrong, when the officers of these corappellants, that "that is certain which porations assume, in the excess of their
can be made certain."
We do not powers, to create burdens upon property
think, from the language used in the holders. Certainly, in the absence of
first and third sections of the act under legislation restricting the right to interconsideration, that the legislature in- fere in such cases to public officers of the
tended that the taxpayers should be state or county, there would seem to be
required to go to the tax duplicate and no substantial reason why a bill by or on
ascertain the amount of the taxables, behalf of individual taxpayers should not
and then make a calculation to ascertain be entertained to prevent the misuse of
the amount to be assessed. The amount corporate power. The courts may be
is imperatively required to be specified, safely trusted to prevent the abuse of
but there is a limitation placed upon the their process in such cases :" Crampton v.
board, by providing that such amount Zabriskie, 101 U. S. 601. To same
shall not exceed two per cent. of the effect see also Normand v. Otoe Co., 8
taxables upon the duplicate for the preMNob.18 ; Page v. Allen, 58 Penn. St.
ceding year. When the amount of the 338; Webster v. Harwinton, 32 Conn.
appropriation is stated in the petition 131 ; Oliver v. Keightley, 24 Ind. 514 ;
and notice, in dollars and cents, the tax- Terrett v. Sharon, 34 Conn. 105 ; Merpayers will know the extent 9f the burden rill v. Plainfield, 45 N. H. 126 ; Drake
they are asked to assume."
v. Phillips,40 Ill. 388 ; Grant v. DarerUpon the same point see, also, Gin., port, 36 Iowa 396 ; Made v. Richmond,
Nab. 4- Mich. Railroad Co. v. Wells, 18 Gratt. 583 ; Douglass v. Placerville,
39 Ind. 539 ; Alexander v. Pits, 7 18 Cal. 643; Stevens v. Railroad Co.,
Cush. 503 ; Crooke v. Board, 36 Ind. 29 Vt. 546: Gifford v. Railroad Co.,
320.
10 N. J. Eq. 171 ; Baltimore v. Gill
Who may restrain the Issue of Mu- 31 Md. 375; Hooper v. Ely, 46 Mo
nicipal Bonds.-That an injunction will 505 ; Bronenberg v. Co. Com., 41 lnd.
lie at the suit of a taxpayer to restrain 503; Wright. v. Bishop, 88 I1. 302;
the illegal issue of bonds has been de- flodgman v. C. 6- St. P. Railway Co.,
VOL. X
.- 40
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20 Minn. 59; Mcl'ke v. Pen, 51 Mo.
64 ; Goegden v. Supervisors, 2 Biss. 332;
Finney v. Lamb, 54 Ind. I; U. P.
Railroad Co. v. Lincoln Co., S Dill.
300; Butler v. Dunham, 27 Ill. 477,
478 ; Prettyman v. Supervisors, 19 Ill.
406; Steines v. Franklin Co., 48 Mo.
176 ; Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U. S.
601.
Whether or not the attorney-general,
on behalf (f a state, may bring an action to enjoin a municipality from issuing bonds is a question as to which
there is considerable conflict of opinion.
In People v. M'iner, 2 Lans. 396, Judge
MuLLnrT decided that the attorney-general possessed no such authority, either
at common law or under the statute. In
his view, the only cases in which the
attorney-general was authorized to interfere to restrain corporate action or
was a necessary party to an action for
that purpose were those in which the
act complained of would produce a public nuisance, or tend to the breach of a
trust for charitable uses.
See, also,
People v. Albany, etc., Railway Co., 5
Las. 25.
Judge DILLON criticises this view.
"It is observable" (says he, 2 Mun.
Corp., 3d ed., sect. 912, note), "that
the learned Judge (MULLIN) seems to
reason upon the 'basis, believed to be
fundamentally erroneous, that the people, that is the state, in its corporate
capacity and character, has no manner
of interest in a litigation where the question is whether corporate powers which
it granted have been exceeded or not."
Judge DXLLOSN thus states the law:
"The weight of authority seems to be
that the attorney-general of a state or
its other public law officer has, by virtue
of his office, the right, in his name, or in
the name of the state, upon the relation
of persons interested, to bring, in cases
which are properly of equitable cognizance, a bill in equity to prevent municipsi corporations from exceeding the line
of their lawful authority, or to have

their illegal acts set aside or corrected."
2 Dill. Mun. Corp., 3d ed., sect. 912.
In May v. City of Detroit, 12 Am.
L. R., N. S. 149, it is decided that the
attorney-general may enjoin a municipal
corporation from paying money on a contract made in disregard of its charter,
Judge Coormy holding such a case
analogous to the violation of a corporate
trust for charitable uses, and declaring
that the same rule applies in both cases.
To the effect also that the attorneygeneral may enjoin an ultra vires issue of
bonds by a municipality. See State v.
Saline Co., 51 Mo. 350 ; Davis v. %miner,
2 Duer (N. Y.) 669, and the numerous
authorities cited therein.
Appeal from Decision to Issue Bonds.It may be doubted whether an appeal
will lie from a "decision"
of county
commissioneis to issue bonds. Such appeals are frequently allowed by the legislature, but not from decisions which involve the exercise of discretion or are
legislative in their nature. Thus, in the
case of O'Boyle v. Shannon, 80Ind. 159,
an appeal from an order of the board of
county commissioners selling railroad
stocks belonging to the county was dismissed. The court decided that "this
discretionary power of county commissioners over the property of their respective counties 4as been held to be
analogous to the legislative power possessed by many municipal bodies, and is
distinguishable from the judicial or guast
judicial powers conferred upon such commissioners (Hanna v. Board, 29 Ind
170). It follows, therefore, that the
order of sela, from which an appeal was
prayed in this case, was not a " decision"
within the meaning of the statute authorizing appeals from county commissioners
in a large class of cases. See also Hamrick v. Rouse, 17 Ga. 56.
Notice to Purchaser- Suspicion of
Title.-There is no question that a person who takes commercial paper before
it becomes due, for a valuable consideration, without knowledge of any defect
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nf title, and in good faith, will hold it
by a valid title against all the world.
The other proposition that suspicion of a
defect of title or a knowledge of circumstances which would excite such suspicion
in the mind of a prudent man, or gross
negligence on the part of the teker, at
the time of the transfer will not defeat
his title, is not so well established. But,
though it is apt to strike the mind somewhat unfavorably, it is probably good

law. It is knowledge of a defect in a
title that vitiates it, and mere suspicion
is not knowledge nor is gross negligence
knowledge of a defect in the title, although it may be evidence of such
knowledge: Murrayv. Lardner, 2 Wall.
I10 ; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 ; Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 343; Bank of
Pittsburghv. Neal, 22 Id. 96.
ADELBERT HA)MLTON.
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A married woman having separate estate, who executes a promissory note as
surety for her husband, will be presumed, without further proof, to intend thereby
to charge her separate estate. Such presuffiption can only be overcome by proof of
facts or circumstances surrounding the execution and delivery of the note, which
show that such was not her intention.
Real estate purchased by a married woman with her individual means, becoming
her general property, was, by a subsequent statute, changed into her separate estate
subject to vested rights. Such property was not thereby subjected to her debts previously made, and the husband's freehold, jura uxoris, was not divested. Subject,
however, to vested rights, and with reference to her future contracts, such property
is to be regarded as separate property.

ERRoRt to the District Court of Madison county.

The action was brought to charge the separate estate of a wife
with the payment of two promissory notes for $200 and $400, executed by husband and wife, the wife having a separate estate at the
time.

The facts, as agreed upon, were that prior to 1833, John Williams
died intestate,.possessed of 1804 acres of land, leaving four children,

John Williams, Jr., Harrison Williams, Washington Williams and
defendant, Elizabeth Florence, then Elizabeth Williams, his only
children and heirs, to whom descended this land as tenants in
common in fee simple. Elizabeth Williams married Robinson Florence in 1833, and they have ever since that time resided together

as hufband and wife.

About 1840, Robinson Florence purchased

Harrison Williams's undivided one-fourth of said land.

About

1845 he purchased John Williams, Jr's., -undivided one-fourth.
About 1840, the undivided one-fourth of Washington Williams
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was set off, assigned and conveyed to him in severalty by his cotenants. Between 1856 and March 22d 1860, Edward Edwards
contracted with Robinson Florence for furnishing materials and
building a house on the remaining three-fourths of said land which
was then owned by Robinson Florence and his wife, Elizabeth
Florence, as tenants in common, the husband owning two undi
vided fourth parts, and his wife owning one undivided fourth part.
Edwards constructed the house between 1856 and March 22d 1860,
in pursuance to the plans and according to the directions of the
husband, Robinson Florence. About March 22d 1860, Robinson
Florence became financially embarrassed, and was compelled to
dispose of his interest in said lands, and on that date, by agreement, partition was made of the undivided three-fourths (the husband's interest), by whieh one-fourth was assigned to the wife in
consideration of her release of her inchoate right of dower in the
other two-fourths, which two-fourths were sold free from such right
of dower to pay the debts of said Robinson Florence. The house
built by Edwards was on the land assigned to the wife. In 1861
or 1862, Robinson Florence was insolvent, and was indebted to
Edwards in the sum of $600 in the construction of the house. In
1867 Edwards claimed $800 as due him from the husband, but
offered to take $600 in full satisfaction if Robinson Florence, who
was still insolvent, would give him his notes payable to R. B.
Adams & Co., or order, to whom said Edwards was indebted;
one for $200 due in one year from date, with interest, and the
other for $400 due in two years from that date without interest,
with his wife, the said Elizabeth, as surety thereon. This offer
was accepted, and the notes in suit executed and delivered accordingly. Elizabeth Florence knowingly signed said notes as surety
for said Robinson. Said notes were subsequently assigned by said
R. B. Adams & Co., for value, to the plaintiffs.
The District Court, on this statement of facts, rendered judgments in favor of the wife, Elizabeth Florence, and this proceeding was prosecuted to obtain a reversal of this judgment.
DOYLE, J.-If the defendant, Elizabeth Florence, 'was, at the
date of the execution of the notes, the owner of the real estate
described in the petition, or any part of it, as her separate property, the judgment of the District Court is wrong.
When a married woman, owning a separate estate, executes a
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promissory note, either for herself or as surety for her husband,
the presumption is that she charges her separate property with the
payment thereof. Such presumption cannot be overcome by testimony by the wife that such was not her intention. Unless there are
circumstances surrounding the transaction which show that such
was not her intention, it is not material what her secret purpose
was, and the presumption aforesaid will prevail.
The finding, therefore, by the District Court, that she knowingly signed the notes as surety for her husband, is sufficient to
bind her separate property-(if she has any), notwithstanding the
denial in her answer that by the execution of the notes she made
such charge, or the averment that she did not by word or deed,
promise to pay said notes out of her separate estate, or pledge the
same for such purpose: Avery v. Van Sickle, 35 Ohio St. 270;
Williams v. Urmston, Id. 296.
The next question is, was Mrs. Florence possessed of a separate
estate at the date of the execution of the notes in 1867 ? We are
relieved from considering the question whether or not the estate
which the wife now owns, having come to her prior to 1833, shall
be governed by the common law, by the fact that the usband and
wife in 1860 united in conveying this land to a trustee, who afterwards conveyed the same to the wife. Whatever interest the husband had, passed by his deed to the trustee, and when the title
became again vested in the wife, his rights accrued under the law
as it then stood. The rule asserted in Tabler v. Wiseman, 2 Ohio
St. 207, and AcBain v. XcBain, 15 Id. 337, that no new title
is created in statutory partition proceedings, does not apply to the
deliberate conveyances of the parties, especially where there is an
independent consideration for such conveyances. In the present
case, the wife, in consideration of the conveyance to her of the
land in question, which was improved by the house in the erection
of which this debt was incurred, released her inchoate right of
dower in the remainder of the land. The rights of the parties are,
therefore, to be determined under the law as it stood in 1860, and
such modifications thereof as the legislature has since, within the
constitutional powers, made by statute.
By the common law, the husband, upon marriage, became vested
with the wife's estate of inheritance during coverture, and if he'
survived her, and issue capable of inheriting it had been born to
them, he had a life estate by the curtesy. This interest of the

318

HERSHISER, ADAMS & CO. v. FLORENCE.

husband's could be taken for his debts, and he could convey or
incumber it, hence the wife was not secure of a home in her own
lands during the life o~f her husband. To mitigate this, the Act
of February 28th 1846 was passed, which provided that such husband's interest shall not be liable for his debts, nor could he convey or incumber except by joint deed during the life of the wife,
or the life or lives of the heir or heirs of her body: Jenneyj v.
Gray, 5 Ohio St: 45. This act was in force in 1860, when the
wife's present title accrued.
The Act of February 11th 1824, regulating descent and distribution of estates, contained a provision that it should not apply to
tenancy by the curtesy, hence it was left as it existed at common
law. The Act of 1835 amending the Act of -1824, provided that
the act should not affect tdnants by the curtesy "in any estate of
inheritance of any deceased persons."* This act was again amended
in 1853, which added the provision that "surviving husbands,
whether there has been issue born during the coverture or not,
shall be entitled to the estates of their deceased wives by the
curtesy." This was construed not to vest an estate like unto
curtesy initiate, but operated only to enlarge the rights of a surviving husband, and that the right of the possession and control of
the real estate of his wife was unaffected by the act: Denny v.
McCabe, 35 Ohio St. 576; .Bank v. Stauffer, 10 Penn. St. 398;
1 L. Ca. in Am. Law of Real Prop. 259; Monroe v. Van Meter,
100 Ill. 847. This legislation preserved to the husband during
coverture the possession and the rents and profits of his wife's
land and. curtesy cbnsummate without power to convey or incumber the interest or to be charged with his debts. We think
no estate by the 6urtesy vested in the husband in this case in
1860 when the. title of the wife was received. In 1861, ah act
was passed providing that any estate or interest, legal or equitable, in real estate belonging to a woman at her marriage, or which
comes to her during coverture by conveyance, gift, devise or
inheritance, or by purchase with her separate money or means,
shall, together with all rents and issues thereof, be and remain her
separate property and under her sole control, * * * but the
estate by curtesy, after the wife's decease, is not affected, nor is his
estate subject to his debts, nor can he convey or incumber it but by
her joining in the deed, nor does the act affect any vested rights.
This act deprived the husband of the possession and the rents and
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profits during coverture, but saved him curtesy after his wife's
death. It turned the general property of the wife into her
separate estate ; not in all respects like the separate estate which
existed in equity, but a statutory separate estate, which did not,
and could not, affect vested rights. Hence, it was decided that
before the Act of 1861, her note was not a charge on her property,
because such property was not her separate estate: Logan v. Thrift,
20 Ohio St. 62; -allis v. Keys, 35 Id. 265. The legislature has
power to enlarge the power and control of the wife over her own
property so as to affect her subsequent conduct, but not to interfere
with vested rights. The Act of 1861 converted the general property of the wife into separate property, without affecting vested
rights, and does not take away or impair any right of the wife, nor
without her consent create any new obligation. With respect to
past transactions, it does not attach any disability or liability.
With respect to her future acts, this act and the amendment of
March 23d 1866 enables her to charge such property as her separate property. The rights of the husband, which vested in him
prior to the Act of 1861, are not affected. He is still entitled
jure uxoris to the possession and rents and profits during the
joint lives of himself and wife. That is the only right preserved
by the acts prior to the Act of 1861. If he survive her, he will
be entitled to estate by curtesy.
Therefore, subject to the marital rights of the husband, she can
charge this estate as her separate property, by contracts or obligations entered into by her subsequent to the passage of the Act of
1861 creating the separate estate. Hence, in this case, the rents
and profits of the land in question cannot be subjected to the payment of the notes sued on. They belong to the husband during
the joint lives of himself and wife. Subject thereto, however, the
notes are a charge upon the wife's estate, which can be sold, if
necessary to pay them.
In several cases expressions have been used in conflict with this
view. In Clark v. Clark, 20 Ohio St. 128, it was held that a married woman oculd not maintain ejectment for land acquired before
1861, having no words creating by deed separate estate, because
the husband is entitled to possession during their joint lives.. That
opinion is also inaccurate in stating that the husband has an
inchoate estate of curtesy with the present right of possession ;
because there is no curtesy before the birth of issue. The bus-
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band becomes seised of a freehold by the marriage, but it is his-,
wife's freehold, not his. In contemplation of law, her person is
his person, and her seisin his seisin. After issue born, he has a
separate estate: Lancaster Co. Baxk v. Sthuffer, 10 Penn. St.
398; Huthon v. Lyon, 2 Mich. 94; Tong v. Marvin., 15 Id. 60;
Tiurber v. Townsend, 22 N. Y. 517; Billings v. Boker, 28 Barb.
343; 9 Ind. 187, 371.
In Olark v. Clark, supra, it is said "lands conveyed to a
married woman prior to the Act of April 3d 1861, do not, by
virtue of that act, become the separate property of the wife."
The only question, however, before the court was whether the Act
of 1861 divested the husband of his marital right to the possession, so as to enable the wife in her own name to maintain an
action of ejectment, and the quoted proposition must be read in
that light. The Act of 1861 certainly did not convert his right
of possession into the separate property of the wife, because it was
a vested right, and the act could not and did not purport to have
that effect.
An expression in the opinion in .Fallis v. Key8 seems to imply
that the act operated on future acquired estates only. But the
property of the wife in that case was undoubtedly her separate
property admitted to have been acquired after 1861, and the question being whether it could be charged with an obligation entered
into prior to 1861, this question was not before the court, and it did
not attempt to decide it.
Judgment reversed.
JOHNSON, 0. J.-I
dissent from the first point in the syllabus
for the reason stated in Levi v. Earl, 30 Ohio St. 147. I concur
in the judgment upon the facts stated in the record, but differ as to
the effect of the Act of 1846. It is stated that that act limited the
freehold estate of the husband jure uxoris, exempting it from
liability for his debts, or being sold or encumbered by him and
therefore the estate was a freehold vested in him alone during
coverture which entitles him to sole possession with the exclusive
right to the rents, issues, and profits of the land. The Act of
1846 goes farther. Its sole object was to protect a married woman
and the heirs of her body in the enjoyment of the possession, rents,
issues, and profits of her general estate acquired after the Act of
1846, in common with her husband during coverture, and during
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the life of heirs of her body. This was done by taking from him
all the common-law incidents of a sole freehold estatejure uxoris.
It is not liable for his debts,. nor could he sell or encumber it,
without she consented by joining in a valid conveyance.
It was solely for her benefit and that of the heirs of her body
during their lives.
As to lauds acquired by a married woman after the Act of 1846,
her husband acquired an estate of freehold in common with his wife
the owner of the fee, and she, jointly with him, is entitled to
the possession, rents, issues, and profits, and it follows that this
interest of the wife during coverture, became the separate property
of the wife by virtue of the Acts of 1861 and 1866. Hence I concur in the judgment but think that this joint interest of the wife in
common with her husband is under the Acts of 1861 and 1866
chargeable.
This is an important case in view of
Ina owistraction of a peculiar enabling
statae, and, in view of the division of
those married women statutes into three
distigc clas, namely, those statutes
whichmake the wife the owner, at law,
of th property she had before, and that
acquired during marriage, instead of
letting it pass to the husband by the
rules of the common law-statutes which
merely exempt the property from her
husband's debts, contracts or obligations,
and statutes which not only make her the
owner at lawr of the property, but exprealy empower her to contract and be
contracted with at law as a feme sole.
The points decided by this case are,
first, that, during the existence of the
common law, property which came to the
wife by conveyance, gift, devise or inheritance, etc., without words of separate
estate, became her general property, and
all rights vesting, such as curtesy, during
the continuance of such estate, were
not impaired when such property was
changed into her separate estate. Second,
that a statute providing that the property
belonging to a woman at the time of her
marriage -and that which comes to her
during coverture, by conveyance, gift,
VOL. XXXII.-41

devise or inheritance, or by purchase
with her separate money or means, togetherwith all the rents and issues thereof,
shall be and remain her separate property and under her sole control; converted the general property into separate
estate. Third, that such separate estate
is liable for the payment of a promissory note which she signed as surety
for her husband; because the signing
is proof of the intention to charge
the estate. This intention can be rebutted by proof of facts or circumstances
which show that she did not intend to
charge her estate, but the wife's evidence
or testimony of her secret purpose is not
such proof.
It is interesting to observe the various
doctrines adopted upon this subject and
the origin and growth of this doctrine of
intention, to which the above decision
adheres, as well as the different methods
adopted in the construction of- these
enabling statutes.
The Ohio court affords an apt illustration. In Phillips v. Graves, 20 0. St.
371, the court held that the separate'
estate was liable for the purchase-money
for a piano (evidenced by a writing),
which she purchased for her own use and
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benefit, because it was her intention to
charge her separate estate understood by
all the parties, the court holding that
such estate was liable only when the wife
intends expressly or impliedly to charge
it; that her intention is expressed when
such language is used in the contract
implied when for the benefit of the
estate, or her own benefit on the credit
of the estate ; hence, in this case, the
piano was for her own benefit on tile
credit of the estate, and, therefore, her
intention to charge arose from her contract. In Levi v. Earl, 30 0. St. 147,
the court decided that the separate estate
was not liable for a note wherein the wife
was endorser as surety for her husband;
because there was no intention to charge.
There was no intention expressed, and
as the intention can be implied only when
the contract is for the benefit of the
estate or fcr her own benefit on the
credit of the estate and her contract of
surety was not either of these, her intention to charge did not arise from her
accommodation endorsement.
In Rice v. Railroad,32 0. St. 380, it
was held that the separate estate was not
liable for her subscription to pay money,
because there was no intention to charge
expressed in the subscription, and such
intention could not be implied from the
mere fact of subscribing to pay. The
case of Williams v. Urmston, 35 0. St.
296, decided that the separate estate was
liable for a note executed by her as surety
for her husband, because her intention to
charge was implied from the mere execution of the note. In Avery v. Van
Sickle, 35 0. St. 270, the court held that
all of the separate estate was liablefor her
note given for the purchase-money of real
estate, although such note was secured
by mortgage on the property purchased
and exhausted by other liens. The case
of Harris v. Wilson, decided by the Supreme Court Commission, Dec. 1883,
follows Williams v. Urmston and Adams
4- Co. v. Florence. The cases of Levi v.
Earl and Rice v. The Railroad, follow

Phillips v. Graves in this that, in the
latter case, the intention is implied, because the contract was made on her own
account upon the credit of the estate and
she received the benefit. In the former
cases (Levi v. Earl and Rice v. Railroad) the intention was not implied, because she or her estate received no benefit, the court stating that her intention to
charge could not be implied from her endorsement in one case and her subscription in the other. Williams v. Urmston,
followed by Avery v. Van Sickle, Adams
4- Co. v. Florence and Harris v. Wilson,
held that the intention to charge is implied from the execution of the note.
Phllips v. Graves, followed by Levi v.
Earl and Rice v. Railroad, holds that
the intention is implied only when the
consideration is for the benefit of the
estate, or her own benefit upon the credit
of the estate.
The doctrine in Williams v. Urmston is
the English doctrine, which has nothing
at all to do with the doctrine of intention, and the rule in Phillips Y. Graves
is the American doctrine of intention.
It is universally conceded that the
common law prevails, except in so far
as these statutes expressly, or by necessary implication, change it, or except in
so far as removed by the statutes
(Brookings v. White, 49 Me. 479; Edwards v. Stevens, 3 Allen 315; Perkins
v. Perkins, 62 Barb. 531 ; Mallett Y,.
Parham, 52 Miss. 922 : Ma/on v. Gormley, 24 Penn. St. 82; Alversopn v. .ones,
10 Cal. 9 ; Farrell v. Patterson, 43 Ill.
52; Stanton v. Kirsch, 6 Wis. 338; Smith
v. Hewett, 13 Iowa 94 ; Johnson v. Runyan, 21 Ind. 115); just in regard as
to the separate estate in equity, the
common law prevailed, except in so far
as the trust gave to equity jurisdiction
to change it; although it has been
held that this is not the proper construetion, bnt that the construction should
be adopted which would best effectuate the intention of the legislature and
the purpose of the act : Power v.
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v. Lester, 17 How. Pr. 413 (Goss v.
Cahill, 42 Barb. 310; Bergey's Appeal,
10 P. F. Smith 408; Ratcliffe v. Dougherty, 24 MisA. 181; Hffv.
Wright, 39
Ga. 43 ; Stone v. Gazzam, 46 Ala. 275.
Hence these statutes do not, unless they
so provide, interfere with nor operate
upon the relations, duties and responsibilities existing betvieen husband and
wife ( Walker v. Reamy, 12 Casey 410 ;
Schindel v. Schindel, 12 Md. 108; Cole
v. Van
&p~r,
44 Ill. 58; Duning v.
Pike, 46 Me. 461); nor do they take
from the husband his marital rights,
except as they pertain to her property;
nor relieve him from responsibility,except
as they relate to the wife's contracts and
debts binding upon her separate estate:
Pippen v. Wesson, 74 N. C. 442; Davis
v. Bank, 5 Neb. 247 ; Pond v. Carpeilter, 12 Minn. 432 ; Conway v. Smith,
13 Wis. 131 ; Snyder v. The People,
26 Mich. 108; Mitchell v. Otey, 23
Miss. 239.
Under the ttird class of statutes,
namely, those which provide that a
married woman may contract, sue and
be sued as a feme sole, she is empowered
with the capacity of a person sui juris;
but under the class which merely
exempts her property from liability for
his debts, she has no power of contract
or separate estate : Willard v. Eastham,
15 Gray 328; Dufee v. McClurg, 6
Mich. 223; Duren v. Getchell, 55 Me.
241 ; Cookson v. Toole, 59 Ill. 515;
Albin v. Lord, 39 N. H. 196; Batchelder v. Sargent, 47 N. 11. 262; Beard
v. Dedolph, 29 Wis. 136; Derries v.
Conklin, 22 Mich. 255.
The other
statutes give to the wife a separate
estate at law, instead of letting it pass
to the husband under the rules of the
common law; but such property vests
in the wife as a wife, and not as a
person sui juris (Johnson v. Cumins,
1 C. E. Green 97; Leonard v. Rogan,
20 Wis. 540; Barton v. Beer, 35
Barb. 78; Bradford v. Greenway, 17
Ala. 797), and do not invest her

with the general power of contract
(Jones v. Crosthwaite, 17 Iowa 393;
.McKee v. Reynolds, 26 Id. 578; Tracey
v. Keith, 11 Allen 214; Rovey v.
,Smith, 22 Mich. 170) ; nor enable her
to bind her person, nor enter into personal contracts ; but she can charge this
legal, separate estate, created by statute,
to the sane extent and for the same
purposes that she could have charged
her equitable separate estate (Todd v.
Lee, 15 Wis. 365; Yale v. Dederer, 18
N. Y. 265 ; Ballin v. Dillaye, 37 Id.
35; Albin v. Lord, 39 N. H. 196);
because the statute does not interfere
with the equity jurisdiction or power
to charge (Johnson v. Cummins, 1 C. E.
Green 97 ; Cbokson v. Toole, 59 11.
515) ; nor change the status of marriage
(except to deprive the husband of his
property interest), nor change the common-law disability to contract, except
as the statute so empowers: Cole v. Van
R'per, 44 Ill. 58; Duning v. Pike, 46
Me. 461; Peake v. LaBaw, 6 C. E.
Green 269; Schindel v. Schindel, 12
Md. 108.
It has been held that as these statutes
confer the right to hold and enjoy the
separate estate, it follows that any act
or contract which enables the wife to use,
hold and enjoy such separate estate will
bind such estate at law, because such
contracts are incident to the right conferred (Armstrong v. Stovall, 26 Miss.
280; Maclay v. Love, 25 Cal. 381 ;
Carpenterv. Mitchell, 50 IlI. 473; Wilkinson v. Cheatham, 45 Ala. 341 ; West
v. Laraway, 28 Mich. 465; Todd v.
Lee, 15 Wis. 365 ; Johnson v. Cummins,
1 C. E. Green 97; Peake v. LaBaw, 6
Id. 269 ; Albin v. Lord, 39 N. H. 196;
Cookson v. Toole, 59 Ill. 515) ; and the
grant of a thing or power carries with it
every power necessary to make the grant
effective. But as these statutes merely
create a legal separate estate, *ithout
conferring the power to contract or disturbing the equity doctrine to charge,
she can only make contracts binding in
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equity and not at law, because the express, when she expressly charges the
power to charge comes by implica- estate : such as a specific charge, morttion from the equity doctrine, and the gage or lien, or by express words makes
power to contract cannot be de- the contract a charge upon it; implied,
rived by implication, but must be ex- when she does not expressly charge the
pressly conferred: Devries v. Conklin, estate, but the -facts show that she con22 Mich. 255 ; Mitchell v. Smith, 32 tracted so as to make the estate the
Iowa 484; King v. Mettalbergtr, 50 debtor, such as her note or written obliMo. 182; Colby v. Lamson, 30 Me. gation, and such at inured to the benefit
of the estate. From this came the doc119 ; Leonard v. Rogan, 20 Wis. 540;
Faucett v. Currier, 109 Mass. 79 ; Ames trine of intention. When she expressly
v. Foster, 42 N. H. 381; Richmond T. charged the estate there existed an exTibbles, 26 Iowa 474. Hence, it fol- pressed intention. When she executed
lows, that a married woman can bind a note or written obligation, or the
her statutory separate estate by the contract inured to the benefit of the
same contracts and to the same extent estate, the courts held that her intention
that the equitable separate estate could was implied.
In Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut,
have been charged, and can make no
other or further contract, and has no Iowa, Kansas, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryother or further power unless the statute land, Missouri, Ohio, Wisconsin and
expressly confers it. This being cor- some others, the courts adopt and follow
rect, it follows that in those states where the doctrine of express and implied inthe English principle is followed the rule tention : Cowles v. Pollard,51 Ala. 445 ;
is, that unless restrained by the statute, Short v. Battle, 52 Id. 456; Palmer v.
a married woman has full capacity to Rankins, 30 Ark. 771 ; Plattv. Hawkins,
contract with respect to her separate 43 Conn. 143; McCormick Y. Holbrook,
estate so as to make that estate the 22 Iowa 487 ; Knagsv. Mastin, 9 Kans.
debtor; and in those states where the 547; Furness v. McGovern, 78 Ill. 338 ;
American principle is adopted the rule is, Williamson v. Williamson, 18 B. Mon.
that unless the statute, expressly or by 385; Hall v. Ecaleston, 37 Md. 510;
Whiteley v. Stewart, 63 Mo. 363 ; Wilnecessary implication, confers the power
to contract, she has no capacity to contract liams r. Urmston, 35 0. St. 296; Todd
except such as is necessary to hold and v. Lee, 15 Wis. 380; Radford v. Carenjoy such separate estate. The one rule wile, 13 W. Va. 572 ; Morrison v. Solois the opposite of the other. Under the man, 52 Ga. 206. In California the
former rule she can contract with respect courts seem to hold that the contract
to her separate estate so as to make such must be a specific charge, or in the
estate the debtor, under the latter rule, she nature of a specific charge : MaclaV v.
cannot contract except in so far as the Love, 25 Cal. 382. See Pond v. Carstatute, expressly or by necessary impli- penter, 12 Minn. 430. In Indiana the
cation, enables her to do it. Under intention to bind or charge the separate
both rules she can make contracts to estate must be expressly declared, and
enable her to hold and enjoy the estate, will not be inferred: Shannon v. Bar.
such as for needed improvements or tholomew, 53 Ind. 54; Hodson v. Davis,
repairs-contracts beneficial to the es- 43 Id. 258. In New York it was held
tate : Kelly on Contracts of Married that the intention to charge must be
declared in the contratt itself, or the
Women 269, and cases cited.
Following the English rule, a married consideration of the contract must be
woman's contracts are express or im- for the direct benefit of the estate: Yale
v. Dederer, 22 N. Y. 450 ; Man *attan
plied charges on her separate estate;
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Co. v. Thompson, 58 Id. 84; Woolsey
v. Brown, 11 Hun 52. Subsequently
this was extended to contracts made on
the credit of the estate for its use and
benefit: Bank v. Hiller, 63 N. Y. 639 ;
Conlin v. Cantrell, 64 Id. 217. This is
the same as holding that the estate is
liable when the contract is made With
respect to the separate estate, so as to
make such estate the debtor; because
she can only do this when she expressly
makes it the debtor, and when she contracts on the credit or for the benefit of
such estate.
The rule in New York is followed in
Massachusetts, Maine and New Jersey:
Burr v. Swan, 118 Mass. 588; Verrill
Y. Parker, 65 Me. 578; Perkins v.
Elliott, 7 C. E. Green 127 ; Pentz v.
Simonson, 2 Beas. 232. In Pennsylvania the American rule prevails that a
married woman can only make the contracts allowed by the statute : Shonk
v. Brown, 11 P. F. Smith 320 ; Pa.
Co. v. Foster, 11 Casey 134; Haines v.
E/lis, 12 Harris 253.
As the power to bind the statutory separate estate comes from the
equitable doctrine to charge the equitable separate estate in which is involved
the doctrine of intention, it is necessary
to understand this doctrine.
A separate estate for married women
created by trust was recognised in
courts of equity for the purpose of excluding the common-law marital rights of
the husband and securing to the wife an
independent estate and income, free from
the control and interference of the husband. See Murray v. Barlee, 3 M. &
K. 219; Owens v. Dickinson, Cr. & Ph.
48. And in the beginning the doctrine
was established that, with respect to this
separate estate, she is free from the
common-law disability of coverture, and
invested with the rights and powers of a
person suijuris; not unlimited or unqualified, but with respect to her separate estate (Norton v. Turrille, 2 P.
Wins. 144 ; Dowling v. Maguire, Plunk.
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19; Clinton v. 11:illis, 1 Sugd. Pow.
208; Kenge v. Delevall, I Vern. 326).
Because to every estate or interest in
property held by a person sui juris, the
common law attached the right of alienation-the jus disponendi-unless restrained by the investment creating
it, equity admitted this right, and
it followed that as she was sui juris
in equity with respect to this estate,
she had the full power of dispositionthe jus disponendf. Lord TiuaLow,
in Pythus v. Smith, 3 Bro. C. C. 347,
introduced the provision against alienation-restraint of the jus disponendi
-then
it was ruled that if not restrained she was, in equity, a feme sole
as to her separate estate.
This was
limited to her capacity to enjoy and dispose of the estate (Griby v. Cox, I Yes.
517; Allen v. Ppworth, Id. 163; Pea..
cock v. Monk, 2 Id. 190), and it was
conceded that she could charge the estate
by a specific charge, such as a mortgage
or an instrument -in execution of the
power of appointment, this being an
exercise of the jus disponendi. This
was followed by the ruling in Ilulme v.
Tenant, I Bro. C. C. 20, that a married
woman not only had the jus disponendi,
as when she contracted that this or that
portion of the estate should be disposed
of in this or that way, but also that such
estate was liable for her contracts and
debts ; but the point decided was, that
a separate estate without restraint of the
jus disponendi was liable for her bond,
hence the decision added to the rule the
liability for her bond, and a dictum that
it was liable for her debts: Bolton v.
Williams, 2 Ves. Jr. 150 ; Greatley v.
Nroble, 3 Mad. 94 ; Stuart v. Kirkwall,
3 Id. 387; Angell v. Eadden, 2 Mer.
164.
This case referred to Allen v.
Papworth, 1 Yes. Sr. 163, and Grigby
v. Cox, Id. 517, to support the ruling;
but these cases do not support it, but
held the estate liable only when she specifically pledges it and expressly acts
with respect to it.
Rulme v. Tenant
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had a quasi precedent in Norton v.
Turville and Stanfbrd v. Marshall, but
the facts were not the same. The
doctrine of Hulme v. Tenant was shortly
thereafter questioned and doubted
(Nantes v. Carrock, 9 Ves. 188; Jones
v. Harris, Id. 497; Sperling v. Rocford, 8 Id. 175; Parkes v. White, 11
Id. 221 ; Whistler v. Newman, 4 Id.
129), and7 disapproved on principle
(Bolton v. Williams, 2 Yes. Jr. 138;
Jones v. Hirris, 9 Yes. 486 ; Aguilar
v. Aguilar, 5 Mad. 414, and some
others), for the reason that the proposition, "that with respect to her separate
estate a married woman is a feme sole,"
means that she is a feme sole only
quoad the capacity to enjoy and dispose
of the estate, and not that she has the
full power to contract. The possession
of the estate did not per se, confer the
power to contract, but by receiving it,
she also received the power to enjoy it
and dispose of it; and a priori, the power
to contract concerning it. To hold that
the estate is liable for a bond or other
like obligation, which does not refer or
relate to the separate estate, 'nor the
exercise of the jus disponendi, but which
is merely a personal contract, as is held
in Hulme v. Tenant, is to give effect to
a void contract, and charge a personal
contract to pay money only, into a contract to be paid out of a particular estate,
constituting it an exercise of the jus
disponendi. See the opinions in Jones v.
Harris; Grealey v. Noble; Stuart v.
Kirknall; Sackett v. Wray, supra.
At this period there existed these two
doctrines : one, that the estate was liable
for all her debts, at least her bonds,
because she was the owner (in equity),
and this liability is incident to ownership ;
the other, that it was not so liable, but was
liable for a specific charge-an appointment or a disposition-because she has
not the general power to contract, but
could deal with and concerning the
estate.
The rule announced in Hulme v.

Tenant, that the separate estate was
liable for the wife's bond, was extended
to her note (Bullpin v. Clarke, 17 Ves.
365 ; Fieldv. Su,'le, 4 Russ. 112 ; Tulleft v. Armstrong, 4 Beav. 323), and
bill of exchange (Stuart v. Kirkwall, 3
Mad. 387; Coppin v. Gray, 1 Y. & C.
Ch. 205 ; McHenry v. Davies, L. R., 10
Eq. 88), and subsequently to any writing
(M'aster v. Fuller, I Ves. Jr. 513;
Vaughn v. Vanderstegen, 2 Drew. 180;
Murray v. Barlee, 4 Sim. 82), not on
the ground advanced in Hulme v. Tenant, but on the ground that suchlobliga.
tions were equitable appointments or an
exercise of the jus disponendi; because
such obligation was given to be effective, and as it could only be effective
against the separate estate, not her person, she therefore intended that the
estate should be liable: Shattock v.
Shattock, L. R., 2 Eq. 182; Matthewman's Case, L. R., 3 Eq. 787.
One class of decisions asserted the
liability existed, because such contracts
were debts and incident to ownership:
Partericle v. Powlet, 2 Atk. 383 ; Allen
v. Papworth, I Ves. Sr. 163; Hulme v.
Tenant, 1 Bro. C. C. 16. Another
class, because such obligations were in
the nature of an appointment or incident
to the power to dispose: Bolton v.
Williams, 2 Yes. Jr. 142; Whistler v.
Newman, 4 Ves. 145 ; Shattock v. Shattock, L. R., 2 Eq. 182; Harrisv. Mott,
14 Beav. 169. Both held terem binding. The latter class stepped from
Lord ELDOv's opinions but endeavored
to place such liability on his reasonings,
namely, that she intended the writing as
an appointment or disposition. Subsequently the cases repudiated this ground
and held that the liability existed because they are debts; "having the
property in equity, she has the power of
contracting debts to be paid out of it :"
Owens v. Dickenson, Cr. & Ph. 53 ;
Hughes v. Turner, 3 M.. & K. 690;
Murray v. Barlee, 3 Id. 209. And
established the doctrine of intention
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(Johnson v. Gallagher, 3 De G., F. & J.
515; Leeds' Banking Co.'s Case, L. R.,
3 Eq. 787; Chubb v. Stretch, L. R., 9
Eq. 555), and that there was no distinction between her contracts or debts
evidenced by a writing, and her contracts and debts evidenced by parol. The
verbal contract is binding when the intention is expressed and the written contract because the intention is implied:
Owens v. Dickenson, Murray v. Burke,
Mathewman's Case, L. R., 3 Eq. 787 ;
Johnson v. Gallagher, Picard v. Hine,
L. R., 5 Eq. 274. This distinction is
only one of form. The inference that
she intended to charge her separate
estate should be drawn from the contract, not from the form or evidence of
the contract. However, whether the
liability is placed on the doctrine of intention, the jus disponendi, an equitable
appointment, or an incident of ownership, the weight of authority holds such
estate liable for her instrument in
writing.
This doctrine of intention has been
applied to what is spoken of as her
general engagements, such as goods
bought or sold, or renting a house, or
contracts in the ordinary course of domestic life. On this subject a good
review was made in Johsonv. Gallagher,
supra, where Lord Justice TURNER stated
that the result of the cases is that to bind
the separate estate by a general engagement it should appear that the engagement
was made with reference to and upon
the faith and credit of that estate, and
whether it was so or not Is a question to
be determined upon all the circumstances
of the case. KINrDnRSLET, V. C., in
.3fatthewran'sCase, supra, adopted, this
principle and stated that "if the wife
contracted not for her husband but for herself, with respect to her separate estate,
that estate will be liable." Whether
this was done is a fact to be proved.
The rule was followed and considered
settled in The Bank of Australia v.
Lempriere, L. R., 4 P. C. Ap. 591, that

as to general engagements to bind the
separate estate they must be made with
reference to and upon the faith and
credit of the estate.
From the English cases the conclusion
is that her bonds, bills, notes and contracts in writing are binding on the
estate, but the reason therefor is not
settled. All contracts, parol or written,
are binding when she expressly stipulates that the estate shall be charged.
All other contracts, debts or engagements are binding when tQle intended to
contract so as to make her estate the
debtor. Such intention will be presumed when she lives separate and apart
from her husband. This is nothing
more than, the doctrine of intention.
Now such written and verbal obligations
are binding, either because she is, in
equity, a feme sole, with a general power
to contract, but with the remedy against
the estate ; or because of her intention
to charge the estate. The former can not
be the reason, because the possession of
separate estate does not and can.not per
se release her from her general disability
at law and confer upon her a general
power of contract, and because if this is
the ground, all her contracts, including
her general engagements, would be binding as if made by a person sui juris,
which would be contrary to the cases
since Johnson v. Gallagher. The latter
can not be the reason, because there is
not, in the absence of acts or words, any
principle for drawing a constructive intention to charge, nor any principle for
holding that the intention to charge is
implied from her written and not implied
from her verbal contracts. A better
rule would be that a married woman
having a separate estate is not a feme
sole in every respect, with the.general
power of contract, but is a feme sole
with respect to her separate estate,
namely, a feme sole to enjoy and dispose
and a feme sole to make obligations and
incur debts with respect to it so as to
make the estate the debtor. This can be
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done when her contract expressly stipu- unless restrained by the instrument
lates that such is the case, or when she creating the separate estate a married
refers to the estate, or when the contract woman is, with respect to that estate, a
is mutually made on the faith and credit feme sole in equity, and may dispose of
of the estate, or when it is for the bene- such estate without the consent or confit of the estate.- In all cases the ques- currence of her trustee, and charge it by
tion should be was the contract made so her agreement when she indicates her
as to make the separate estate the intention to effect it," Chief Justice
debtor.
SPENCER stating "that when a feme
The lead in repudiating the English covert having separate estate, enters
doctrine was taken in 1811 by the South into an agreement and sufficiently indiCarolina Court in Ewing v. Smith, 3 cates her intentionto effect it, her separate
Des. 417, holding that a married woman estate is liable if no fraud or unfair adhhs no power over her separate estate vantage."
Subsequently it was held
and no capacity to contract but such as that not only must the married woman
is given in the instrument which creates sufficiently indicate her intention but that
it ; and that unless the instrument intention must be declared in the concreating the estate (deed of trust or tract, or the consideration must be for
statute) expressly provides that the and going to the direct benefit of the
estate shall be liable for her debts and separate estate, ( Yale v. Dederer, 22 N.
contracts, or in the absence of this, that Y. 451 ; 18 Id. 265 ; 21 Barb. 286 ; 68
the obligation was incurred to effectuate N. Y. 329), although the exact question
the object and purpose of the trust, the in Yale v. Dederer was whether a marestate is not liable for her contracts,
ried woman, having a separate equitable
written or unwritten, and as her person estate, could create a charge on that
is not .iable, such obligations are null estate by giving a promissory note for
and void. This was doubted in Trustem the debt of her husband, without indiv. Center 4- Hall, 1 MeCord Ch. 270, in cating in the note her intention to charge,
1826, but affirmed in Magwood 4- Patter- and the conrt decided that she could not.
son v. Johnston et a[., I Hill Ch. 228, in This case was followed (W/rite v. Mc1833, and has since been followed. In
Nedt, 33 N. Y. 371 ; Owen v. Cowley,
1817 Chancellor KENT, in Methodist 36 Id. 600; Ballin v. Dillaye, 37 Id.
35; Fowler v. Seaman, 40 Id. 592;
Episcopal Church v. Jacques, 3 Johns.
Ch. 78, stated that the English cases Ins. Co. v. Babcock, 42 Id. 613; Bank
were so floating and contradictory as to V. Scott, 59 Barb. 641); then her inleave him free to adopt the true princi- tention verbally expressed was allowed
ple and hold that instead of maintaining, (Maxon v. Scott, 55 N. Y. 247 ; Weir
as is the English rule, that a married v. Groat, 4 Hun 193; Bank v. Miller,
woman has the full power to contract, 63 N. 7. 639 ; Rohrbach v. Ins. Co., 62
unless restrained by the instrument N. Y. 47), then the court regretted that
creating the estate, the converse would the doctrine was so settled (M. B. 4- M.
be more correct that she has no power
Co. v. Thompson, 58 N. Y. 80), and in
but what is specially given and to be one case the intention was allowed to be
exercised only in the mode prescribed,
inferred from circumstances: Conlin v.
and if no mode prescribed it is intended
Cantrell, 64 N. Y. 217. The rule in
to leave it at large to the discretion or this state could he placed upon the Engnecessities of the wife. This ruling was lish doctrine if the intent is allowed to he
reversed by the Court of Errors (17 inferred from the execution of the note;
Johns. 548) and the English rule but since Yale v. Dederer the doctrine
substantially adopted, holding "that
rt st on her expressed intent, written or
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verbal, not implied ; hence, if the contract is made so as to make the estate
the debtor, it will bind the estate.
The American doctrine, as first advanced in South Carolina and expounded
by Chancellor KENr, has been adopted
and followed in Pennsylvania (Thomas
v. Fowell, 2 Whart. I i ; Lancaster v.
Dolan, 1 Rawle 231 ; Kelly's Cont. M.
W. 258, cases cited), Tennessee (Ware
v. Sharp, I Swan 489 ; Morgan v. Elam,
4Yerg. 375; Kirkbyv. Miller, 4 Coldw.
4; Litton v. Baldwin, 8 Humph. 209),
Mississippi (Armstrong v. Stovall, 26
Miss. 275; Davis v. Wilkerson, 48
Id. 585), Rhode Island (Metcalf v.

Cook, 2 R. I. 355) and North Carolina (Harrisv. Harris,7 Ired. Eq. 311 ;
Pippen v. Wesson, 74 N. C. 442; Atkinson v. Richardson, 74 Id. 458), whilst
all the other states adopt substantially
the English doctrine: Kelly's Cont. M.
W. 259, note 5, where all the cases
are collated.
These were the two distinct doctrines
when the married woman's statutes
were enacted in the several states of the
Union, and as first shown these rules
have been used in the construction of
JoHN F. KELLY,
these statutes.
Bellaire, Ohio.
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A minor who executes a conveyance of real estate must disaffirm it within a
reasonable time after he comes of age, or be barred of his right to do so.
When there is mere delay to disaffirm after coming of age, and there is nothing
to explain or excuse it or show its necessity, whether the delay is for more than a
reasonable time is a question for the court. A delay of three years and a half
unexplained is unreasonable.

APPEAL from an order of the District Court of Winona county.
W. H. Yale and J. N. Gilman, for respondents.
Tkomas Wilson, for appellants.
GILFILAN, C. J.-November 27th 1857, Elizabeth M.'Hamilton, then a married womani and owner of certain real estate in the
city of Winona, conveyed the same, her husband joining in the

deed, to the defendant Huff, under whom the other defendant
claims. Mrs. Hamilton was born April 21st 1842. She died
December 16th 1867, and her husband died November 10th 1874.
Plaintiffs are their children, Mary, born March 31st 1859, and

Eugenia, January 29th 1863.

They bring the action to avoid the

conveyance, *because of the minority of Elizabeth

i. Hamilton

when she executed it. Plaintiffs gave notice to the lumber comVOL ." =K1-I.-42
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pany of their intent to disaffirm the conveyance, March 22d 1883.
Treating this as a sufficient act of disaffirmance in case they then
had the right to disaffirm, and it is not material whether it was or
not, for the bringing of the action, which was sufficient, immediately followed, there elapsed between the execution of the deed and
its disaffirmance twenty-five years and four months. The disability
of infancy on the part of the infant grantor ceased April 21st 1863,
and as the real estate was owned by her at the time of her marriage,
her disability from coverture, so far as affected her right to reclaim,
hold and control the property, ceased August 1st 1866, when the
General Statutes (1866) went into effect; so that for four years
and eight months before she died she was free of the disability of
infancy, and for one year four and a half months she was practically
free of the disability of coverture. During the latter period, at
least, she was capable in law to disaffirm the deed, if she had the
right to do so, and-if she was required to exercise the right within
a reasonable time after her disability ceased, the time was running
for that period. The youngest of the plaintiffs became of age
January 29th 1881, so that even if the period of minority of plaintiffs were to be excluded (and we doubt if it should be), there is to
be added at least two years and two months to the time which had
elapsed when the grantor died, making the time three years and
over six months.
The main question in the case is, must one who, while a minor,
has conveyed real estate, disaffirm the conveyance within a reasonable time after minority ceases, or be barred. Of the decided cases
the majority are to the effect that he need not (where there are no
circumstances other than lapse of time and silence), and that he-is
not barred by mere acquiescence for a shorter period than that prescribed in the Statute of Limitations. The following are the principal cases so decided: Vaughan v. Parr,20 Ark. 600 ; Boody v.
McKenney, 23 Me. 517; Davis v. Dudley, 70 Id. 236; Prout v.
Wiley, 28 Mich. 164; Youse v. .Norcom, 12 Mo. 550; Norcum
v. aaty, 19 Id. 69; Peterson v. Laik, 24 Mo. 541; Baker v.
Kennett, 54 Mo. 82; Huth v. Car. Mar. Railway & Dock Co.,
56 Id. 206; Hale v. Gerrish, 8 N. H. 374; Jackson v. Carpenter,
11 Johns. 539; Voorhies v. Voorhie§, 24 Barb. 153; 1c~urray
v. Mcurray, 66 N. Y. 175 ; Lessee of Drake v. Ramsey, 5 Ohio
252; Cresinger v. Lessee of Welch, 15 Id. 156; Irvine v. Irvine,
9 Wall. 627; Ordinary v. Wherry, 1 Bailey 28.
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. On the other hand, there are many decisions to the effect that
mere acquiescence beyond a reasonable time after minority ceases
bars the right to disaffirm, of which cases the following are the
principal ones; Holmes v. Blogg, 8 Taunt. 35; Dublin & W.
Railway Co. v. Black, 8 Exch. 180; Thomasson v. Boyd, 13
Ala. 419; Delano v. Blake, 11 Wend. 85; Bostwick v. Atkins,
3 N. Y. 53; Chapin v. Shafer, 49 Id. 407; Jones v. Butler, 30
Barb. 641; Kline v. Beebe, 6 Conn. 494; Wallace's Lessee v.
Lewis, 4 Harr. 80; Hastings v. Dollarhide, 24 Cal. 195; Scott
v. Buchannan,11 Humph. 468; Hartmanv. Kendall,4 nd. 403;
Bigelow v. Kinney, 3 Vt. 353; Richardson v. Boright, 9 Id.
368; Harris v. Cannon, 6 Ga. 382; Cole v. 1Pennoyer, 14 Ill.
158; Black v. Hills, 36 Id. 376; Robinson v. Weeks, 56 Me. 102;
Little v. Duncan, 9 Rich. Law 55.
The rule holding certain contracts of an infant oidable (among
them his conveyances of real estate), and giving him the right to
affirm or disaffirm after he arrives at majority, is for the protection
of minors, and so that they shall not be prejudiced by acts done or
obligations incurred at a time when they are not capable of determining what is for their interest to do. For this purpose of protection the law gives them an opportunity, after they have become
capable of judging for themselves, to determine whether such acts
or obligations are beneficial or prejudicial to them, and whether
they will abide by or avoid them. If the right to affirm or disaffirm
extends beyond an adequate opportunity to so determine and to act
on the result, it ceases to be a measure of prdtection, and becomes,
in the language of the court in Wallace's Lessee v. Lewis, "a
dangerous weapon of offence, and not a defence." For we cannot
assent to the reason given in Boody v. lfcKenney (the only reason
given by any of the cases for the rule that long acquiescence is no
proof of ratification), "that by his silent acquiescence he occasions
no injury to other persons, and secures no benefits or new rights to
himself. There is nothing to urge him as a duty to others to act
speedily."
I The existence of such an infirmity in one's title as the right of
another at his pleasure to defeat it, is necessarily prejudicial to it,
and the longer it may continue the more serious the injury. Such
a right is a continual menace to the title. Holding such a menace
over the title is, of course, an injury to the owner of it; one possessing such a right is bound in justice and fairness towards the
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owner of the title to determine, without delay, whether he will
exercise it. The right of a minor to disaffirm on coming of age,
like the right to disaffirm in any other case, should be exercised
with some regard to the righls of others-with as much regard to
those rights as is fairly consistent with due protection to the interests
of the minor.
In every other case of a right to disaffirm, the party holding it is
required, out of regard to the rights of those who may be affected
by its exercise, to act upon it within a reasonable time. There is
no reason for allowing greater latitude where the right exists
because of infancy at the time of making the contract. A reasonable time after majority within which to act is all that is essential
to the infant's protection. That ten, fifteen or twenty years, or
such other time as the law may give for bringing an action, is
necessary as a matter of protection to him is .absurd. The only
effect of giving more than a reasonable time is to enable the mature
man, not to correct what he did amiss in his infancy, but to speculate on the events of the future-a consequence entirely foreign to
the purpose of the rule which is solely protection to the infant.
Reason, justice to others, public policy (which is not subserved by
cherishing defective titles), and convenience, require the right of disaffirmance to be acted upon within a reasonable time. What is a
reasonable time will depend on the circumstances of each particular
case, and may be either for the court or for the jury to determine.
Where, as in this case, there is mere delay, with nothing to explain
or excuse it, or show its necessity, it will be for the court: Cochran
v. Toher, 14 Minn. 385 (Gil. 293) ; Derosiav. W. & St. P. Railroad Co., 18 Minn. 133 (Gil. 119). Three years and a half, the
delay in this case (excluding the period of plaintiff's minority, after
the time within which to act had commenced to run), was prima
facie more than a reasonable time, and primafacie the conveyance
was ratified.
Order reversed.
The general rule as to when certain
acts of infants may be avoided by them,
is well stated by Judge REEVE (Reeve's
Dom. Rel. *254), as follows: "It is a
universal rule that all executory contracts which are voidable on the ground
of infancy, may be avoided during infancy by the infant as well as afterwards ;

as where a minor promises to pay, &c.
So, too, all contracts respecting property which are executed by delivery
or some article, on payment of money,
may be rescinded by the minor both
before and after the time of his coming
of age. But conveyances of real prop rty by feoffment, on delivery of
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the deed which comes in lieu of pay- 585 ; Stucker v. Yoder, 33 Id. 177 ;
ment, or by any other conveyance of
Jenkins v. Tenkins, 12 Id. 195 ; Stout
such property, in fee, for life or years, v. Merrill, 35 Id. 56.
The English cases lay down the rule
cannot be avoided before the infant
attains to full age." See, also, Tyler that the infant is bound expressly to
repudiate his contracts within a reasonon Inf.& Coy., ch. iv., p. 69, sect. 30;
Ewell's Lead. Cas. 96 et seq.
able time after arriving at majority;
The authorities are not agreed, how- and that, if he neglect to do so, his
ever, as to how soon after reaching silence will amount to an affirmance.
majority the infant must exercise his See Dublin, 4-c., Railway Co. v. Black;
privilege of disaffirming his voidable Holmes v. Blogg, cited in the principal
deed of land. A very respectable class case ; N. W. Railway Co. v. McMiclzael,
of authorities hold, as stated in the 5 Exeb. 114; Leeds, 4-c., Railway Co.
principal case, that they may be avoided v. Fearnley, 4 Id. 26 ; Cor-k, 4-c., Railat any time after reaching majority tillway Co. v. Cazenove, 10 Q. B. 935.
barred by the statute of limitations, and See this general subject well considered,
that silent acquiescence alone for any and the case of Dublin, 4-c., Railroad
period less than the period of limitation,
Co. v. Black, criticised in the note of
is not a bar. Besides the cases cited by Messrs. Bennett and Smith to that case
the court in the principal case, see Ur- as reported in 16 Eng. Law & Eq. 556ban v. Grimes, 2 Grant's Cas. 96;
558. This note will also be found in
Tucker v. Moreland, I0 Pet. 76; 1 Ewell's Lead. Cas. 174. None of the
Pars. on Cont. (5th ed.) 325, 326, and cases above cited, however, are cases of
notes.
deeds executed by infants, but all,
There can be no doubt, however, that except Holmes v. Blog (which as to
latse of a less period of time, taken in this point is a mere dictum), are actions
gonnection with other circumstances, for calls upon railway shares, and seem
may amount to a confirmation (see Les- to have been decided upon the point that
see of Drake v. Ramsey, and Cresinger the infant cannot remain a shareholder,
v. Lessee of Wdch, cited in the principal cannot keep the interest and prevent the
case) ; as for example, by way of estop- company from having it and dealing with
pel, as where the infant vendor after it as its own, without being liable to
attaining majority, saw extensive im- bear the burden attached to it. See N.
W. Railway Co. v. McMichael. Hence
provements made on the premises by his
vendee, and said he had sold the lot, had these cases are to be distinguished from
been paid for it, and was satisfied:
the cases of deeds executed by infants.
Rooinson v. Weeks, 56 Me. 102, cited
Wheaton v. East, 5 Yerg. 41. See,
also, Hartman v. Kendall; Wallace's by the court in the principal case, was
Lessee v. Lewis, cited by the court in an action to recover back money paid
the principal case; also Aorris v. Stew- for stock.
art, 14 Ind. 334.
The case of Tomasson v. Boyd, 13
Another class of cases lays down the Ala. 419, did not relate to land, and in
rule adopted in the principal case, that it the infant retained the consideration
the infant must avoid his deed, if at all, as well as omitted to disaffirm.
within a reasonable time after reaching
In Delano v. Blake, 11 Wend. 85,
majority. See the cases cited by the the infant retained the consideration an
court in the principal case. This rule unreasonable length of time after reachis established by statute in Iowa as to ing majority. This case did not relate
all the contracts of infants: Rev. 1860, to land.
sect. 2540 ; Wight v. Germain, 21 Iowa
In Bostwick v. Atkins, 3 N. Y. 53, there
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was no conveyance by the infant devisee, but a purchase by his testamentary
guardian of the real estate of the testator,
at a sale under a surrogate's order.
The sale was beneficial to the infant,
and eighteen years had elapsed after his
majority before he sought-to impeach it,
during which time the title had passed to
innocent parties.
In Chapin v. Shafer, 49 N. Y. 407,
the infant had mortgaged chattels, and
the court laid down the rule that the infant had a right to avoid at any time
before majority and within a reasonable
time thereafter, and held that an unconditional sale and delivery of the property
to a third person was such an avoidance.
In J'ones v. Butler, 30 Barb. 641, the
contract was a marriage settlement, and
the suit was brought against a trustee for
an account and for his removal on the
ground of misappropriation of the trust
property. In this case the infant, after
majority, had ratified the deed.
Little v. Duncan, 9 Rich. Law 55,
was an action upon a sealed note, of
which there had been an express ratification.
In Cole v. Pennoyer, 14 Ill. 158, the
case turned upon a statutory provision,
and Blackc v. Hills, 36 111. 376, is, as to
the point in question, a mere dictum.
The cases of. Kline v. Beebe, 6 Conn.
494 ; Wallace's Lessee v. Lewis, 4 Harr.
80 (a nisi prius case); Hastings v. Dollarhide, 24 Cal. 195; Scott v. Buchannan, 11 Humph. 468; Hartman v.'
Kendall, 4 Ind. 403; Bigelow v. Ken-

ney, 3 Vt. 353 (approved in 9 Vt. 368),
and Harris v. Cannon, 6 Ga. 382, of
all the cases cited by the court in the
principal case, seem to be the only ones
that really are authorities upon the
question. Of the second class of cases
nearly all .cite the case of Holmes v.
Blogg, 8 Taunt. 35 ; . c. 1 Moore 466,
or subsequent cases decided on its authority, as authority in supporting their
positions. The rest seem, as we have
seen, to have been somewhat influenced
by equitable or other circumstances, as
where the infant has stood by, after majority, and seen valuable improvements
made on the premises without dissent;
has retained and disposed of the consideration after majority, &c.
Although the rule stated in the principal case is a just and proper rule of
which no infant can reasonably complain, it would seem that it ought to be
established by legislative authority and
not by the courts; and that by the
weight of common-law authority, in the
case of deeds of conveyance executed W
infants, mere acquiescence short of the
period of limitation, and not accompanied by circumstances rendering it
inequitable to adopt the rule just stated
in the principal case, and manifesting a
clear intention to be bound by the conveyance, will not operate as an affirmance of such deed. See the rule well
stated by CHRISxANCY, J., in Prout v.
Wiley, 28 Mich. 167.
M. D. EwzLL.
Chicago.
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Supreme Court of Minnesota.
BROWN v. MINNEAPOLIS & ST. LOUIS RAILWAY COMPANY.
A railway station agent having general charge of the tracks in and about his
station, isthe fellow-servant of an engineer engaged in running a locomotive upon
any of such tracks, and hence the common master of the two is not responsible to
the engineer for injury which he may receive in consequence of the negligence of
such station agent in respect to the tracks.
APPEAL

from an order of the District Court, Hennepin county.

Hferrick & Merrici, for appellant.
T. A Springer, for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-While plaintiff was running a regular passenger
train upon defendant's railroad as a locomotive engineer, his
engine (without apparent fault on his part), ran into some box-cars
standing upon the main track at Winthrop 'station and he was
injured. The main track was that to which plaintiff's train was
entitled. The freight cars had been placed there by persons not
in defendant's employ, for their own convenience, and without
other authority 'than the assent of the station agent. They were
placed there about 3 P. m., and the collision occurred at 7.35 P. m.,
so that they had then been there more than four hours. The
train was due at the station at 7.27. The plaintiff put in evidence a rule of the company as follows:
"Station agents are responsible for safety of switches, which
must always (except when a man is standing by) be kept right for
trains running on main track. They must see that no cars are
moved on side track so near the switches as not to properly clear
the main track. Cars must not be allowed on the main track to
load or unload, unless permission is obtained from train-master."
There was no evidence of any other rule or regulation, express
or implied, as to the management of the tracks at or about the
station, or as to the duties of a station agent. But we agree with
the plaintiff's counsel that, in the absence of controlling evidence
to the contrary, an ordinary railway station agent is to be taken as
having general charge of the tracks at and about his station.
BERRY,
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This is a reasonable presumption of fact, founded upon the ordinary
course of business, the common understanding of the public, and
the nature and necessities of the case. Of course, the station
agent is always subject to the control of his superiors, and his
general charge may be limited by rules and regulations; as, in
this instance, by the prohibition to place cars upon the main track
to load or unload without permission from the train-master, or by
the assignment of some portion of what would ordinarily be his
duties to some other person. The presumption spoken of appears
to be assumed by the rule put in evidence.
As a consequence of these views, it is clear that, upon the facts
before stated, it was the duty of the station agent, as respects the
plaintiff, to see to it that the main track was unobstructed and
ready for his train, and that, in suffering it to be obstructed as it
was, the agent was guilty of negligence through which plaintiff
was injured. As respects the defendant, this negligence of the
station agent is the only negligence of which plaintiff can or does
complain. In this state of facts the trial court dismissed the
action, being of opinion that the station agent was plaintiff's fellowservant, and that, therefore (no charge of incompetence being made
against him), plaintiff cannot recover for the injuries resulting
from his negligence. It remains to. consider whether this opinion
iscorrect.
-Primafacie the plaintiff and the station agent were fellowservants, for they were acting together under one master in carrying out a common object: Gilman v. Eastern Railroad Co., 10
Allen 233. They were engaged in the same common employment,
under the same general control: Cooley on Torts 544, and casbs
cited. They were subject to the same general control, coupled
with an engagement in the same common pursuit: Wood, Master
& Servant, §§ 426, 435, and cases cited: Meowan v. Railroad
Co., 61 Mo. 528; Thompson on Negligence 1037, § 38. Is
there anything to except the station agent from this prima facie
relationship of fellow-servant to the plaintiff? He would be
excepted only if he stood in the place of the master as a viceprincipal, or, as it is sometimes expressed, as the master's alter
ego: Malone v. Hathaway, 64 N. Y. 5. But one employed
becomes a vice-principal as respects another only when he is
entrusted with the performance of some absolute and personal
duty of the master himself, such as the providing of proper instru-
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mentalities with which the service required of an employee is to be
performed, or the general management and control of the master's
business, or of some branch of it: -Drymala v. Thompson, 26
Minn. 40; and cases cited: Wood, Master & Servant, §§ 390,
488; Mullan v. P. & S. M. S. Co., 78 Penn. St. 25; .alone
v. lathaway, supra. In such cases the negligence of the viceprincipal is the negligence of the master: .Drymalav. Thompson,
supra; Tay v. Railroad Go., 30 Minn. 231; Cooley on Torts 560,
563; Corcoran v. Holbrook, 59 N. Y. 517; Quincy H, 0o. v.
Kitts, 42 Mich. 84; Booth v. Bailroad Co., 73 N. Y. 38. But
the general management or control of the master's business, or
some branch thereof, does not include the case of one simply
charged with special duties performing them under the direction
of the master, or under the control of superior officers : Malone v.
Hathaway, supra.
Applying the rulh that, the facts being undisputed, the relation
of the station-master to the plaintiff is a question of law : Marshall v. Schricker, 63 Mo. 309, in our opinion, the station-master
in this case does not fall within the exception to the rule making
him prima facie plaintiff's fellow-servant. Here there was no
neglect to furnish or maintain suitable instrumentalities for the
performance of plaintiff's proper service; and herein this case
differs essentially from Drymala v. Thompson, supra, relied upon
by plaintiff. There the track itself was defective. Here no complaint i's made that the track was improperly constructed or in bad
order. But the complaint, in effect, is that a proper track was
improperly used or attended to by the station agent. A master is
not, by reason of any absolute or personal duty on his part, liable
to one employee for the improper use of proper instrumentalities
by another: Floyd v. Sugden, 134 Mass. 563; Summersell v.
Fish, 117 Id. 312; Grifflths v. Gidlow, 3 H. & N. 648; ribson
v. Pacific Railroad Go., 46 Mo. 163; Wood, Master & Servant,
§ 871; Brown v. W. & St. P. Railroad Go., 27 Minn. 162; Heine
v. Ghicagqo & N. W. R. C ., 17 Id. 420.
Any other doctrine would obviously lead to most astonishing
consequences. Neither is the station agent's case that of an
officer exercising general control or management of the defendant's
business, or of a branch thereof. He is simply charged with
special duties as to his station, as a switchman sometimes is as to
a particular switch, or an engineer as to a particular engine. His
VOL. X
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